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to issue securities than low quality firms. We show that, when the issuer directly
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restored. A by-product of this conflict of interest is that trade is characterized
by underpricing. Another implication is that the intermediary may act as a
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1 Introduction
Securities issues are typically characterized by the presence of financial intermediaries. As
Ritter (2003) puts it “When a firm decides to issue securities to the public, it almost always
hires an intermediary, typically an investment banking firm”. Despite economists having
long recognized the scope for intermediation in markets characterized by information im-
perfections1 most theories of securities issues take a passive view of intermediaries, and do
not provide a fully satisfactory rationale for their presence.2 This paper aims at filling this
gap in the literature by offering a theoretical justification for the use of intermediation in
securities issues.
The central premise of our analysis is that, when the quality of securities is private
information to the issuing firm, a market where firms issue securities directly to investors
may not be viable. By converse, we show that the presence of an intermediary who (i)
underwrites the issue and (ii) affects the issuing price, restores trade and increases efficiency.
This occurs because the intermediary’s dual role as a buyer and a seller creates a wedge
between her interests and those of the issuing firm, making her interests more aligned with
those of the investors. A by-product of this conflict of interest is that trade is typically
characterized by underpricing.
An important lesson that emerges from our analysis is that, contrary to common per-
ception, collusion between intermediaries and investors may promote rather than hinder the
functioning of the market. By contrast, collusion between intermediaries and issuers should
be avoided, since a conflict of interests between these two parties may actually increase trade.
We cast our model in terms of a market for (equity) initial public offerings (IPOs). This
allows us to make our theory directly comparable to the large existing literature on IPOs,
which we review in section 2.
However, we believe that the insights from our model are more general, and can be
applied to all securities issued through a posted price convention.3
However, we believe that the insights from our model are more general, and apply to a
wider spectrum of securities.
1See for instance, Leland and Pyle (1977), Campbell and Kracaw (1980), Diamond (1984), and Allen
(1990).
2See the section on related literature below.
3As argued by Habib and Ziegler (2007), this is likely to emerge when the cost of acquiring information
for investors is particularly high.
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There are two types of issuers: high quality firms (who may only issue high quality
securities) and low quality firms (who may only issue low quality securities). The issuer
knows his type, while investors/buyers only observe a private noisy signal. An important
assumption of our model is that owners of high quality firms are more reluctant to issue
securities than owners of low quality firms. Intuitively, this occurs since the issuer’s outside
option – namely, being the only claimant to the firm’s cash flows – is more valuable for
higher quality firms. We also assume that trade of securities generates gains only if the
issuer’s quality is high. When quality is low, trade is socially inefficient.4
Under these assumptions, we compare the case in which the issuer directly trades with
investors with situations in which the issue is managed by a financial intermediary.
Since the issuer has more information than the investors, an adverse selection problem
emerges. Bad issuers may want to mimic good issuers. We show that this adverse selection
problem is exacerbated by the issuer’s attempt to signal his type through the choice of the
offering price. As shown by Adriani and Deidda (2009), signaling creates an upward pressure
on the offering price that eventually causes market breakdown. Intuitively, good issuers tend
to raise the offering price to differentiate themselves, while bad types raise the offering price
to mimic good types. This signaling spiral only stops when the offering price is too high
for trade to occur. The behavior of the issuer is thus characterized by what we call “over-
signaling”: the issuer would be better off by committing to offering prices that do not depend
on his information. In this case, a positive amount of trade would be possible.
Since issuing securities directly to the investors is not a viable option for the issuer, we
ask whether a financial intermediary (investment bank) can do better. Consistent with what
happens in practice, the investment bank underwrites the issues and is able to influence the
offering price. We identify a key trade-off.
On the one hand, the presence of an intermediary may ensure that a positive amount
of trade is restored. Since the investment bank underwrites the issue, a conflict of interest
emerges between the bank and the issuer. While all the benefits from a high offering price
accrue to the issuer, the investment bank bears the cost of subscribing potentially overpriced
issues. This conflict between the bank and the issuer reduces the upward pressure on the
offering price, preventing it from spiralling as in the case of a direct issue. As a result, there
4Potential rationales for this feature within the context of IPOs are discussed in section 3. More generally,
this feature may emerge whenever securities issues involve positive transaction costs, and the gains from the
trade of securities are increasing in their quality.
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is no over-signaling and trade is therefore possible. This happens independently of whether
the investment bank is privately informed.
On the other hand, we show that the intermediary always makes losses from her under-
writing activities. Intuitively, the intermediary suffers from a “seller’s curse”. The securities
that she manages to sell on behalf of the issuer are, on average, underpriced. In contrast,
the securities that she doesn’t manage to sell – and for which she has to pay herself – are,
on average, overpriced. As a result, the intermediary is only viable if the underwriting fee
she obtains from the issuer is sufficiently high. This implies that, although the presence of
the investment bank may allow trade to occur, part of the gains from trade must be used to
compensate her for potential losses arising from underwriting.
The question then arises, whether it is possible to simultaneously restore trade, and
keep the investment bank from making losses. We show that this is indeed the case, by
fully characterizing the natural benchmark in which the investment bank makes zero profits
in expectation. In this equilibrium, trade between the issuer and the investor is possible.
Moreover, underpricing is particularly severe since the offering price is the lowest compatible
with participation by the issuer. Finally, the underwriter acts as a screening device, weeding
out those firms that are most likely to be of low quality. The bank only underwrites issues over
which she receives favorable information. This function of the investment bank endogenously
emerges in our model even in the absence of the reputation concerns or other motives that
could apply in a multi-period setting.
Our theory of the role of intermediaries yields implications for two observed features of
the IPO market, namely (i) abnormal first day returns (underpricing), and (ii) increased
popularity of the book-building method.
We identify two channels through which our model generates systematic underpricing.
First, the seller’s curse suffered by the intermediary vis-a`-vis the investor implies that, con-
ditional on the investor purchasing the securities, these are on average priced below their
value. In standard models of adverse selection the seller’s curse would make sellers more
reluctant to trade, thus driving prices upwards. In our setting this logic applies only in part,
since the intermediary is both a buyer and a seller. On the one hand, a more pronounced
seller’s curse increases the underwriting fee that the intermediary requires to break even.
This exerts an upward pressure on the price at which the issuer, who pays the fee, is willing
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to participate. On the other hand, the intermediary suffers from paying an excessively high
price to the issuer. This exerts a downward pressure on the offering price.
Second, we show that securities issued and traded are on average underpriced even when
the intermediary’s informational disadvantage with respect to the investor disappears. Over-
all, therefore, the very presence of an underwriter (whose interests conflict with those of the
issuer) has a negative impact upon the offering price, independently of the information struc-
ture.
Book-building mechanisms facilitate collusion between the intermediary and investors
and exacerbate the conflicts of interests between intermediaries and issuers (see e.g. Reuter,
2006).5 This could raise concerns that book-building may ultimately damage the market
(see for instance Biais, Bossaerts, and Rochet, 2002). However, the increase in popularity
of the book-building method (for instance, in equity or bond IPOs) over the recent years
suggests otherwise. Our theory shows that intermediaries are beneficial precisely because
their interests are not perfectly aligned with those of the issuer. This implies that mechanisms
that exacerbate the intermediary-issuer conflict of interests do not necessarily hinder the
functioning of the market, but may on the contrary facilitate it. We formalize this intuition
by showing that the adoption of book-building may actually promote trade.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the existing literature.
Section three informally discusses the key features of our environment. Section four outlines
the model. Section five extends a recent result by Adriani and Deidda (2009) in order to show
that direct issues fail. Section six focuses on intermediated issues, and derives implications for
underpricing and book-building. Section seven addresses possible extensions and robustness.
A final section presents conclusions and discusses future research. All proofs can be found
in the Appendix.
2 Related literature
Our main contribution is that of providing a novel rationale for the role of intermediaries in
securities issues. Early contributions to the literature include Baron (1982), who analyzes
the optimal delegation contract between an issuer and an investment bank. The investment
bank has private information about demand (and therefore potential proceeds from the
5A key feature of book-building mechanisms is that the intermediary has discretion over the allocation of
securities to investors.
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issue), and her distribution effort is unobservable.6 Baron and Ho¨lmstrom (1980) study the
optimal contract in the context of negotiated sales where the asymmetry of information in
favor of the banker emerges only after the contracting stage due to pre-selling activities.
More recently, Biais, Bossaerts, and Rochet (2002) have analyzed the IPO mechanism that
maximizes proceeds from sales in a setting where the issuer is again the less informed party.
In these contributions, the presence of an intermediary directly follows from the as-
sumption that the intermediary has better information about demand. However, empirical
evidence suggests that this information asymmetry may not always play a key role, at least
in IPOs (see Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1989). By contrast, we focus on uncertainty about
the quality of the prospects of issuing firms (as in Myers and Majluf, 1984). This is known
by the issuer but only imperfectly observed by the intermediary (and by investors). Hence,
in our setting, the intermediary does not possess superior information. Eckbo and Masulis
(1992), using the Myers and Majluf (1984) framework, argue that issuing firms may rely on
underwriter certification to reduce costs associated with adverse selection. However, they do
not explicitly model the underwriter’s incentives to truthfully certify. This issue is addressed
by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994). In their model, reputation concerns provide investment
banks with the incentives to collect information and reveal it truthfully. A similar point is
made by Sherman (1999) who allows for both reputation and litigation costs. The mecha-
nisms highlighted by these contributions are independent of one important feature observed
in security issues, namely underwriting. By contrast, underwriting plays a central role in
our analysis.7
Although underpricing is not our main focus, it is a prediction of our model, and this
relates our work to the underpricing literature. According to Ritter and Welch (2002, p.11),
there are probably “[..] no exceptions to the rule that the IPOs of operating companies are
underpriced, on average, in all countries [..]”. This applies not only to equity but also to
corporate bond IPOs, as documented for instance by Cai, Helwege and Warga (2007). The
existing literature on underpricing in IPOs is extensive and has offered various explanations
for such stylized fact. In Benveniste and Spindt (1989), through underpricing, the invest-
ment bank compensates investors for revealing their information. However, this rationale
6Baron (1979) studies pricing and distribution of issuers when banks’ distribution effort is unobservable
and agents are risk averse. In that context, the optimal contract is such that issuer sacrifices some of the
gains from risk sharing in order to provide the banker with the right incentives to distribute the issue.
7This shares similarities with Ho¨lmstrom and Tirole (1997), although the focus of their work is different
from ours.
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only applies to book-building, while evidence shows that underpricing also occurs with fixed
price offers. In Baron (1982), underpricing emerges because the issuer has to sacrifice part
of the proceeds to provide the investment bank with the right incentives. This hypothesis is
however not supported by the findings of Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989), who find that
even in the case of investment banks going public – a situation in which asymmetric infor-
mation about the demand for the issue should not be relevant – IPOs are still characterized
by significant underpricing.8 This suggests that asymmetry of information about demand
does not play a central role in IPOs. By contrast, the fact that only operating compa-
nies are systematically underpriced suggests that uncertainty about the company’s quality
matters. Several papers have tried to explain underpricing as the product of signaling –
examples are Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989).9
In these models, issuing firms have private information about their value and try to signal
the quality of their prospects to outside investors through the offering price. The rationale
for underpricing is that good firms prefer to “leave money on the table” when going public.
This should credibly signal the issuing firm’s type and allow the issuer to profit from future
equity issues. A problem with this literature is that it predicts a relationship between first
day returns and subsequent seasoned equity issues that is not found in the data, as shown by
Michaely and Shaw (1994). By contrast, in our analysis underpricing emerges as the result
of the conflict of interest between the privately informed issuer and the intermediary. As
such, our explanation for underpricing does not rely on a “leaving money on the table” type
of argument and is independent of seasoned equity offerings.
Beyond its direct implications within the context of securities issues, our work also adds
generally to the economic literature on pricing and signaling (such as Milgrom and Roberts
1986, Bagwell and Riordan 1991 and Ellingsen 1997) and to the literature on certifiers
(such as for instance Lizzeri 1999, Albano and Lizzeri 2001), in several aspects. First, we
show that signaling through price does not necessarily alleviate the problems generated
by adverse selection, and on the contrary it may actually exacerbate them. Second, we
introduce a novel rationale for the existence of intermediaries/certifiers, by arguing that their
8These IPOs are characterized by the presence of underwriting syndicates. Consistent with our story,
institutions whose incentives are not perfectly aligned with those of the issuer participate in the underwriting
and distribution of shares. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) also report that in these IPOs the maximum
offering price is decided by an independent underwriter. This could be interpreted as a way to avoid over-
signaling.
9Alternative or complementary explanations for underpricing are surveyed by Ritter (2003).
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presence may be necessary for trade under conditions of severe adverse selection. Third,
we show that underwriting may be an effective tool to induce information revelation by
intermediaries/certifiers.
Some of the effects at work in our model are echoed by Jullien and Mariotti (2006), who
consider second price auctions in which an informed seller may convey information through
the choice of the reserve price. They show that the presence of an uninformed intermediary
may increase the ex-ante probability of trade. Finally, our result that intermediation may
generate a Pareto improvement for all market participants also shares similarities with Bester
(1995), although his results are derived within a different context.
3 Model Background
As mentioned in the introduction, we present our analysis within the context of a particular
type of security issues, namely initial public offerings. However, we believe that our analysis
extends beyond this specific running example.
Recent empirical evidence (see Brau and Fawcett 2006) argues that one of the main
reasons why firm owners may be reluctant to go public is their desire to retain ownership
and/or control. Common sense suggests that the benefits from retaining ownership/control
should increase with the firm’s quality. Consistent with these ideas, a key feature of our
analysis is that:
(a) Owners of high quality firms are more reluctant to go public than owners of low quality
firms.
The point can be easily illustrated by analogy with a standard lemon setting. Consider
a seller who wishes to sell a good, in exchange for a payment p from the buyer. The good
may be either of type H (high quality) or of type L (low quality). The seller’s valuation for
a type q = H,L good is vq. Since type H goods have greater value, it is natural to assume
that
vH > vL (1)
Condition (1) implies that, when contemplating trade, the outside option of the owner of
a high quality good – namely, keeping the good – is higher than that of the owner of a
low quality good. In turn, this makes owners of high quality goods more reluctant to sell.
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Assumption (a) applies this notion to the case of firms undertaking an IPO. Owners of high
quality firms are more reluctant to go public in the sense that any payment that would
induce them to go public would also induce owners of low quality firms to do so – but not
vice versa.
Is this consistent with existing theories of why firms go public? There is no general
agreement on the theoretical motivations of the decision to go public.10 However, there is
some consensus (see Ritter and Welch 2002) that
(i) a firm’s owner desire to finance further investments/growth opportunities within the firm
and/or;
(ii) his desire to liquidate his position in the firm (cashing out) in order to finance new
ventures
constitute important reasons. Brau and Fawcett (2006), in a survey of chief financial officers,
find strong support for (i) and moderate support for (ii).11 In section A.1 of the appendix,
we formally show that assumption (a) is compatible with both classes of situations, (i) and
(ii).12 In both cases, the issuer accepts to share (or forgo) the return of some assets he owns
in order to raise cash. The issuer’s outside option to going public is therefore determined by
the quality of the assets already in place. Consistent with Tirole (2006, pp. 245-246), the
higher the value of these assets, the more reluctant the issuer is to go public. The model we
consider thus differs from existing signaling models of IPO underpricing, in that we assume
that the outside option of the issuer depends on his type.13 (In what follows, we will use the
expressions “owner of a type q firm” and “type q issuer” interchangeably.)
Another feature of our setup is that
10There is a vast literature on the possible reasons that may induce a firm to go public. Contributions
include Zingales (1995), Ellingsen and Rydqvist (1997), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) and Faure-Grimaud
and Gromb (2004).
11More precisely, they report that more than 30% of CFOs felt that the IPO provides a chance to cash out
for the principal and/or for the venture capitalist.
12It should however be stressed that other theories of going public are not necessarily in conflict with our
assumption. For instance, in Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999), the alternative to going public for a firm
consists of raising finance privately with a venture capitalist. In equilibrium, high quality firms obtain better
conditions from the venture capitalist. Hence, when considering whether to go public, high quality firms have
a higher outside option.
13Signaling models of IPO underpricing typically assume that the issuer seeks to raise cash to finance a
project by offering a share of the future cash flows to investors. While projects differ in their expected value,
issuers of both types have identical outside options. This implies that issuers of type L are more reluctant to
go public than issuers of type H . Whatever share of future cash flows an issuer of type L would be willing to
forgo, a type H issuer would also be willing to forgo. This in turn allows type H issuers to reveal their type
by “leaving money on the table”, i.e. by offering a relatively high share of future cash flows to investors. A
stylized version of these types of models is discussed in Tirole 2006, pp. 262-264.
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(b) Going public is socially efficient (inefficient) if the firm is of type H (type L).
Consider again a standard lemon setting. Suppose that there is a single buyer, and the
maximum payment he is willing to make for a type q good is uq. When a type q is sold,
value is created so long as uq > vq, i.e. the maximum payment that the buyer is willing to
make is above the minimum payment that the seller would accept. The requirement in (b)
can be thus summarized by the following:
uH > vH , uL < vL (2)
In a frictionless world, going public never destroys value. In reality, however, there are
compelling reasons why going public may entail costs that private companies do not face.
A typical example is the cost of complying with a more stringent regulation. A survey by
CRA international, a consultant, finds that the cost of complying with section 404 of the
Sarbanes Oxley act ranges between 1.5 millions dollars for small companies to 7.5 millions for
large companies. Other costs include those resulting from executives having to spend time
negotiating with shareholders and regulators, rather than “getting things done”. For going
public to be efficient, the potential gain from trade must be sufficiently high to outweigh
such costs. In our model, this happens only for type H issuers.
In section A.1 of the appendix, we discuss how examples (i) and (ii) are compatible with
assumption (b) when (a) is also satisfied. The key factor is that the value of the assets in
place is positively correlated with the value of the investment opportunity to be financed.
A natural explanation for this correlation is the persistency of issuer-specific factors such as
entrepreneurial ability, human capital, business or political connections. Issuers with more
valuable investment opportunities are thus more reluctant to go public because they have
more valuable assets in place.
It should be noted, however, that, while assumption (b) allows us to derive our results
in a particularly striking form (especially in section 5, where the issuer tries to market the
shares directly to the investors), it is not the driving force of our story. This point is discussed
further in section 7.
4 The model
We consider issues in the primary market through fixed price offers. (The case of book-
building is discussed in section 6.4). There is an issuer (S), an investor (I), and an investment
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bank (B). We compare two possible mechanisms for issuing stocks: 1) direct issues, 2)
intermediated issues. In a direct issue, S chooses the offering price, I decides whether to
buy, and B retains a passive role. In an intermediated issue, B acts as an underwriter. She
is the only counterpart for both S and I, and can bargain with S over the offering price.
For simplicity, we concentrate on a model in which the offering price is the only choice
variable. This naturally arises in IPOs where either the amount of cash that the issuer wishes
to raise or the number of shares on offer are determined by exogenous forces.14 As discussed
in section 7, this assumption does not play a crucial role for our results.
4.1 Payoffs
In this section, we formally introduce and discuss payoffs of the issuer and of the investor.
Section A.1 of the appendix illustrates how these payoffs may emerge within the context
of the examples (i) and (ii) mentioned in section 3 – namely financing further growth and
cashing out.
Issuer
The issuer S is risk neutral. S’s firm can be of two types: q ∈ {H,L} where H indicates
a high quality firm, while L denotes a low quality one. We assume that S’s type is private
information to S.
The issuer’s payoff from going public net of his outside option is V (p, q), where p is the
offering price and q ∈ {L,H}. V (p, q) is assumed to be continuous and differentiable in p,
and to satisfy the following monotonicity conditions:
A 1.
(i) For all p, p′ ∈ R+, p > p′ and q ∈ {L,H}
V (p, q) > V (p′, q) (3)
(ii) For each q ∈ {L,H}, there exists vq ∈ R+ such that
V (vq, q) = 0 (4)
14The first case emerges when for instance the investment opportunity to be financed through the IPO is
characterized by indivisibilities. The second case applies for instance to privatization IPOs, where the share
of the firm that remains in public hands is fixed by regulators. More generally, as argued by Biais, Bossaerts
and Rochet (2002), in IPOs “[..] the number of shares is indeed most of the time set a priori”.
11
(iii) For all p ∈ R+
V (p,H) < V (p, L) (5)
A 2. For all p and p′ such that p > p′ ≥ vH , V (p,H)V (p,L) > V (p
′,H)
V (p′,L) .
Assumption A1(i) states that the benefit from going public to the issuer increases in the
price at which shares are sold to the investors. The intuition is straightforward if the issuer
aims at cashing out by going public. However, the assumption stands even if the purpose
of the IPO is to raise finance to be invested in the firm. Intuitively, keeping the amount of
finance raised constant, a higher offering price implies that the issuer retains a larger stake
in the firm. He will therefore be able to claim a larger share of the firm’s future cash flows.
Assumption A1(ii) guarantees the existence of reservation prices (vH and vL for type H
and L respectively). A type q issuer would never choose to go public if the offering price
were below vq. Assumption A1(iii) ensures that a type L issuer would profit more from going
public than a type H issuer. Notice that assumptions A1(ii) and A1(iii) imply vH > vL,
namely condition (a) described in section 3.
Assumption A2 provides a sorting condition. It implies that whenever type L weakly
prefers the highest among two offering prices, type H strictly prefers the highest. Formally,
let p ≥ vH and p′ < p be two offering prices and let x and x′ denote the probabilities
that the IPO is successful at p and p′ respectively. Then A2 implies that xV (p,H) >
x′V (p′,H) whenever xV (p, L) ≥ x′V (p′, L). Intuitively, type H benefits relatively more
than type L from a higher price even when this reduces the chances of selling the shares.
Investor
The investor I is risk neutral. We denote I’s net payoff from investing in the firm through
the IPO with U(p, q), where U(p, q) is continuous and differentiable in p. The restrictions
on U(p, q) are symmetric to those in A1.
A 3.
(i) For all p, p′ ∈ R+, p > p′ and q ∈ {L,H}
U(p, q) < U(p′, q) (6)
(ii) For each q ∈ {L,H}, there exists uq ∈ R+ such that
U(uq, q) = 0 (7)
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(iii) For all p ∈ R+
U(p,H) > U(p, L) (8)
Assumption A3(i) ensures that I’s net payoff is decreasing in the offering price. Assump-
tion A3(ii) guarantees the existence of I’s reservation prices for type H and L (uH and uL)
respectively. With perfect information, I would accept to buy shares in a type q firm only
if the offering price were less than uq. Assumption A3(iii) ensures that I prefers type H to
type L. Finally, as in the case of the issuer, assumption A3(ii) combined with assumption
A3(iii) imply uH > uL.
A simple example of payoffs that satisfy assumptions A1-A3 is the linear case V (p, q) =
p − vq and U(p, q) = uq − p. This corresponds to a standard lemon model where the value
of the firm is vq for the issuer and uq for the investor.
We concentrate on situations where the adverse selection problem is particularly severe,
in that, on efficiency grounds, low quality firms should not go public at all. This is condition
(b) discussed in the previous section. Accordingly, we make the following assumption:
A 4. The surplus generated when a type q ∈ {H,L} firm goes public
V (p, q) + U(p, q) (9)
is independent of p and is positive for q = H and negative for q = L.
Note that assumption A4 implies that uH > vH and uL < vL. The requirement that the
surplus generated by trade be independent of the offering price is natural if we interpret p
as a mere transfer of wealth from the investor to the issuer. This is for instance the case in
the simple linear example sketched above. More generally, A4 allows us to establish a clear
benchmark under which to evaluate direct and intermediated issues. This is because social
welfare is only affected by trade and not by the prices at which trade occurs.
Investment Bank
The intermediary B performs an active role only in intermediated issues, which are discussed
in section 6. We postpone the discussion of the presentation of B’s payoff to that section.
4.2 Information structure
The issuer perfectly observes the firm’s type. The information structure of other agents is
as follows.
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Investor. I’s prior is that S is of type H with probability λ and of type L with probability
1−λ. Prior beliefs are common knowledge to all players. I observes two signals: the offering
price, p, and an exogenous private noisy signal, s ∈ [s, s], with conditional density f(s|q)
and cumulative distribution F (s|q).
We assume that f(s|q) is continuous and satisfies the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Prop-
erty (MLRP) so that f(s|H)f(s|L) is a strictly increasing function of s and has full support (0,∞).
Investment Bank. We assume that B receives a signal σ ∈ {h, l} about S’s type; σ is
not observed by I and is distributed as follows
Pr(σ = h|H) = η (10)
Pr(σ = h|L) = 1− η (11)
for η ∈ (1/2, 1).15 B’s posteriors pih ≡ Pr(H|h) and pil ≡ Pr(H|l), with pih > pil, are thus
pih =
ηλ
ηλ+ (1− η)(1− λ) (12)
pil =
(1− η)λ
(1− η)λ+ η(1− λ) (13)
5 Direct Issues
This section essentially extends Adriani’s and Deidda’s (2009) market breakdown result to
the payoff structure assumed in the previous section. The timing of a direct issue is as
follows:
Stage 0 Nature draws q ∈ {H,L} from a Bernoulli distribution with Pr(q = H) = λ.
Stage 1 S observes q and selects an offering price p ∈ R+.
Stage 2 I observes p, his private signal s ∈ [s, s] and chooses whether to buy or not.
15The cases in which the intermediary is perfectly informed (η = 1) or uninformed (η = 1/2) are qual-
itatively similar and are discussed in section 7. The robustness of our results to η = 1/2 is particularly
important, since it makes clear that our results are not simply the outcome of the injection of additional
information in the system.
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Stage 3 payoffs are realized.
If no trade occurs at stage 2, then both S and I obtain their outside options.
The game just described is a signaling game between S and I and the appropriate equi-
librium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). Denote with µ(q|p, s) the belief
function giving I’s probability assessment that S is of type q given p and s. A PBE is a
strategy profile for S and I and a belief function µ∗(q|p, s) which satisfy the usual conditions:
1) S’s best reply, 2) I’s best reply, 3) consistency of µ∗(q|p, s) with Bayes rule for all p that
are selected with positive probability in equilibrium. In order to avoid the common “unsent
message” problem, we refine the PBE concept by restricting attention to equilibria that sur-
vive D1 (see Cho and Kreps, 1987). Intuitively, for any p that is selected with probability
zero in equilibrium, if the set of I’s best responses for which a type q issuer weakly benefits
from selecting p (relative to his equilibrium payoff) is contained in the set for which a type
q′ issuer strictly benefits, then I, upon observing p, assigns probability zero to type q. This
a standard refinement in the signaling literature.16 Section 7 analyzes the robustness of our
results to the use of this equilibrium concept.
We are now ready to state the main result of the section.
Proposition 1. Under direct issue, there exists a unique D1-refined equilibrium outcome
and is such that S charges some price p ≥ uH and no trade occurs.
The proof relies on two observations. The first is that there is no separating equilibrium
in which trade occurs. Consider an equilibrium in which a type q issuer selects action pq
with pL 6= pH , and trade occurs with positive probability. In this equilibrium, type L would
not be trading since, when q = L, trade would make either the issuer or the investor worse
off. This follows from the assumption that it is socially inefficient to trade type L firms
(S’s reservation price vL is greater than I’s reservation price uL). However, if type H were
trading, this equilibrium would violate type L’s incentive compatibility.
The second observation is that other types of equilibria in which trade may occur (pooling
or hybrid) would violate D1. Whenever both types of issuer are pooled together at the same
price, say p∗, a type L issuer would benefit from trading more than a type H issuer, since
vH > vL. This implies that the set of I’s best responses for which type L weakly benefits
from a deviation, p > p∗, is contained in the set of best responses for which type H strictly
16See for instance Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 454-56).
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benefits. According to D1, I’s beliefs should then assign probability zero to the event that
a type L issuer deviated to p. This gives the issuer a strong incentive to raise p in order to
signal that he is of type H and hence increase the likelihood of trading.
A perhaps more intuitive way to explain the result of proposition 1 is the following. If
offering prices were perfectly revealing, type L issuers would want to increase their price to
mimic type H issuers. If offering prices were not perfectly revealing, type H issuers would
want to raise their price to differentiate themselves from type L. This “upward race” would
only stop when the offering price hit the investor’s reservation utility for a type H firm. At
that price, I never chooses to buy the shares as long as the price is selected by type L with
positive probability. Hence, the market breaks down.
Although of similar flavor, the result of proposition 1 is thus different from the classic
example of Akerlof (1970). In Akerlof’s case the market breaks down because adverse selection
exerts a downward pressure on the price. In our case, the reverse happens. The market breaks
down because signaling concerns exert an upward pressure on the price. In a sense, there
is “over-signaling”. If S could ex-ante commit not to use the offering price as a signal for
his type, he would always be able to trade with a positive probability. This is because,
conditional on his private signal being sufficiently high, the investor would be willing to buy
at any pooling price that does not exceed his reservation utility. Hence, rather than solving
the adverse selection problem, signaling through prices exacerbates it.
6 Intermediated Issues
In the previous section we have seen how trade collapses when S tries to market his shares
directly to I. In this section, we ask whether the presence of an intermediary may solve this
problem. We show that the inefficiency that characterizes direct issues can be mitigated by
the presence of an investment bank acting as an underwriter. Key to the result is the fact
that the intermediary’s objectives differ from those of the issuer. Clearly, if the intermediary
and the issuer were to collude (i.e. if their interests were perfectly aligned) the outcome would
be identical to that under direct issues. We identify conditions under which the intermediary
can restore trade between S and I and avoid losing money in the process.
As an underwriter, B buys all shares from the issuer and resells them to the investor. (In
what follows, we use the expressions “the IPO takes place” and “B underwrites the shares”
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interchangeably, to signify that trade occurs between B and S.) For this service, B receives
from S a fixed compensation, denoted with φ.17 The transfer φ is essentially an underwriting
fee which is paid toB in exchange for her underwriting services. The payment of φ is therefore
contingent on the IPO taking place. We do not explicitly model the market for underwriting
services, but rather assume that B takes φ as given. The notion that underwriters do not
condition their compensation on the characteristics of the IPO but instead stick to a given
(common) fee is backed by recent evidence by Chen and Ritter (2000).18
The offering price is determined after B observes her signal σ about S’s type. An aspect
in which this model differs from existing literature is that B is able to influence the offering
price. In order to avoid the complications that naturally arise when considering bargaining
under asymmetric information, we assume an extreme form of bargaining in which B makes
a take it or leave it offer to S about the offering price. This is however not crucial for our
qualitative result. If S accepts the price offered by B, then the IPO takes place. In this
case S makes the transfer φ to B and B announces the offering price to the investor. S’s
net payoff is thus V (p, q)−φ. For future reference we denote with vφH the offering price such
that
V (vφH ,H)− φ = 0 (14)
If S rejects B’s offer, then no IPO takes place and all players obtain their outside options.
For simplicity, we assume that in this case S cannot use a different underwriter.19
The timing of an intermediated issue is thus as follows.
Stage 0 the market for underwriting services determines φ.
Stage 1 Nature draws a type q ∈ {H,L} for S which is observed by S only.
Stage 2 B observes σ and makes an offer p to S.
Stage 3 S chooses whether to accept of reject B’s offer.
17For analytical convenience, we take φ as a fixed amount, rather than a percentage spread on the capital
raised through the issue. Notice however that when the capital that the issuer needs to raise is fixed, these
two interpretations are equivalent. This happens for instance when capital is needed to finance a project that
requires a fixed investment – as is the case in the two examples discussed in section A.1, and in most models
of securities issues (see Tirole 2006).
18They show that, for the US, in more than 90% of IPOs raising between 20 and 80 million dollars, the
underwriter compensation was exactly 7% of the value of the issue.
19Although not explicitly modelled here, one can suppose that the investor interprets using a different
underwriter after the underwriter has acquired information as a signal that the information about the issuer
is unfavorable.
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If the offer is rejected the game ends and players obtain their outside options. If it is
accepted,
Stage 4 B announces p to I.
Stage 5 I observes p and s and chooses whether to buy or not.
Stage 6 payoffs are realized.
A feature of our setup is that it rules out any form of contracting on the offering price
prior to stage 2. As discussed by Ellis et al. (1999), this is consistent with typical IPO
procedures. The firm and the underwriter generally meet to choose the offering price only
on the day prior to the placement of the stocks. By that time, the process of information
collection by the underwriter has already taken place.
Given B’s role as underwriter, it is natural to assume that B acts as a self-interested
agent with incentives that may be different from those of other players. We assume that
when the IPO does not take place, B obtains a payoff equal to zero. When the IPO takes
place and I chooses to buy, shares are transferred from S to I and B’s payoff is equal to
φ. If, by converse, I chooses not to buy, the shares remain in the hands of B. In this case,
we need to determine the utility that B derives from holding a stake in the firm. A natural
starting point is to assume that there are gains from trade between B and I – namely that
holding shares is more valuable to I than to B. If this were not the case, then it would be
unclear why B should act as an intermediary rather than being an investor. On the other
hand, if both have access to the stock market, then the return that B and I can realize from
owning shares in a type q = H,L firm should be the same. For instance, I may want to buy
shares in order to resell them on the stock market at a later date, when the firm’s type has
been observed. If this can be replicated by B, then their returns should coincide. But then,
the gains from trade between B and I may only arise from different opportunity costs.20
This is the route we take here. We assume that the net payoffs of B and I are identical
up to a constant capturing the difference in opportunity costs. B’s net payoff from a type
q firm when I chooses not to buy is therefore U(p, q) −K + φ, where the constant K ≥ 0
represents the gains from trade between B and I.
20Different opportunity costs may for instance arise if the investment bank has investment opportunities
not available to the average investor, as in Sherman (1999).
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A strategy for B is a map from the set of realizations of σ into the set of probability
distributions over R+ (i.e. the set of admissible values for p). A strategy for S is a map from
{H,L} ×R+ (i.e. the set of realizations of q and the set of possible p offered by B) into the
set of probability distributions over {accept, reject}. Finally, a strategy for I is a map from
R+ × [s, s] into the set {buy, not buy}. A PBE is a profile of strategies and belief functions
for B, I, and S such that at any stage of the game: 1) strategies are optimal given beliefs,
2) beliefs are consistent with Bayes rule for all actions played with positive probability in
equilibrium. An equilibrium for the intermediated case is then a PBE of the game just
described and a level of φ such that B makes non-negative expected profits. Again, we focus
on equilibria that pass D1.
From assumption A1(iii), V (p, L)− φ > V (p,H)− φ for all φ and p ∈ R+. This implies
that, whenever a type H is willing to accept B’s offer, a type L issuer would also accept.
An offering price is therefore either accepted by both types or only by type L. B is thus
unable to weed type L out of the market by appropriately selecting the offering price. On
the other hand, before choosing the price, B observes a signal that is not observed by I.
Hence, although the choice of the offering price cannot perfectly reveal the issuer’s type, it
may nevertheless convey information about the realization of B’s signal.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. We first provide two results that
illustrate the tension that emerges between the intermediary’s ability to restore trade and
her viability. We then turn to the full characterization of the benchmark case in which B’s
expected profits are exactly zero, showing that this is compatible with trade.
6.1 Trade vs Viability
In section 5, we saw how the issuer’s signaling concern led to market breakdown. In this
section we analyze the trade off between the requirements that trade should occur and that
the intermediary should break even. We start off by considering the intermediary’s pricing
strategy.
If the offering price is too low to be accepted by type H, but is accepted by type L,
then B would surely lose from underwriting the shares. Intuitively, this follows from the
assumption that no gain from trade can be reaped from trading type L shares.21 Hence, B
may find it optimal to go ahead with the IPO only at a price p that is acceptable to a type
21This intuition is formally proved by lemma C.2 in the Appendix.
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H issuer, i.e. at a price greater than or equal to vφH . Conditional on p ≥ vφH , I believes
that issuer’s type is H with a positive probability. If the offering price is also lower than
his valuation for type H shares, uH , I is willing to buy the shares whenever his signal s is
sufficiently high. Hence, trade between B and I occurs with positive probability. The next
lemma shows that B would always find it optimal to select a price lower than uH whenever
this is compatible with type H’s participation. Hence, once B has chosen to underwrite the
shares, the “no trade” equilibrium identified in proposition 1 can no longer emerge.
Lemma 1. Assume that there is trade between B and S (i.e. the IPO takes place). Then,
vφH < uH is both necessary and sufficient to ensure that trade between B and I occurs with
positive probability.
The proof relies on the following argument. Suppose that B chooses a price p ≥ uH so
that I never buys. At this price, shares are on average overpriced. B would certainly gain
by paying a lower price to the issuer. Hence, B has an incentive to decrease price below uH .
But then, trade with I occurs with positive probability.
Lemma 1 highlights how B’s incentives on price setting differ from those of the issuer.
Intuitively, although B is a seller when dealing with I, she is a buyer when dealing with
S. As a buyer, B suffers from a higher price – since, given φ, her payoff from owning the
shares, U(p, q)−K, is decreasing in p. In contrast, the issuer’s payoff V (p, q) is increasing in
p. This difference in B and S’s price-setting incentives implies that, when the intermediary
is present, the upward pressure on price that characterizes direct issues is mitigated. Trade
may therefore occur at equilibrium.
This discussion stresses the desirability of a conflict of interest between the issuer and
the intermediary. This is in contrast with the existing literature on intermediaries on IPOs,
which has mainly focused on the design of mechanisms geared at aligning the two parties’
incentives.22
The natural next question is whether B can gain from underwriting the shares. Since B
has imperfect information, I’s choice of buying or not conveys information about the value
of the shares. Hence, whenever I chooses to buy at the offering price, B upwardly revises her
valuation for the shares. Similarly, whenever I chooses not to buy at the offering price, B
should revise her valuation downwards. Essentially, B faces an adverse selection problem, or
“seller’s curse”. As a result, B on average makes losses from her underwriting activities. For
22See for instance Baron (1982), Ho¨lmstrom and Baron (1980), and Biais, Bossaerts, and Rochet (2002).
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B to break even, it is therefore necessary that φ, the underwriting fee, be strictly positive.
This shares similarities with a well known result in the literature on market microstructure.
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) show that, in the presence of informed traders, a risk neutral
dealer would need a positive bid-ask spread in order to break even.
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium in which the IPO takes place, B makes no expected losses
only if φ > 0. If the IPO takes place at price p, the following conditions are satisfied:
p ≥ vφH > vH > vL > uL.
As lemma 2 illustrates, the role of φ is that of compensating B of the expected losses
from underwriting.
The requirement that φ > 0 has implications for the price at which the IPO may occur.
As seen above, a type H issuer is willing to accept B’s offering price only if this is greater
than vφH , which is increasing in φ. Intuitively, the larger the fee the issuer must pay, the
higher the offering price must be in order to induce him to sell the shares. Hence, the higher
the expected losses from underwriting, the higher the offering price.
Lemma 1 and lemma 2 highlight a key tradeoff. On the one hand, the presence of an
intermediary may allow trade by mitigating the upward pressure on price that is present with
direct issues. On the other hand, the requirement that this intermediary should be viable
introduces a different sort of upward pressure on the price. Formally, this tension is illustrated
by the requirements imposed on φ by the two lemmata. From lemma 1, trade between B
and I requires vφH , and therefore φ, to be sufficiently small. However, lemma 2 suggests
that the intermediary is viable only when φ is sufficiently large. These two requirements
are in conflict with each other. The main question is therefore whether viability and trade
may coexist. We show that this is indeed possible, by characterizing the benchmark case in
which B makes exactly zero profit. Recent evidence suggests that this case is also empirically
relevant (Hansen, 2001).
6.2 Characterization and existence of the zero profit equilibrium
In this section we restrict attention to the case where B makes exactly zero profit. We divide
the analysis in two parts. First, we characterize the zero-profit equilibrium. We then discuss
the sufficient conditions for the equilibrium to exist, and for it to be unique.
Lemma 3. (Characterization of the zero-profit equilibrium) Let Φ denote the set of values of
φ for which trade between B and I occurs with positive probability and B makes zero profits.
Whenever φ ∈ Φ, a D1-refined equilibrium with trade exhibits perfect separation. The IPO
21
takes place only when B observes σ = h, in which case she offers the lowest price satisfying
the participation constraint of type H (i.e. vφH). When σ = l is observed, B offers a price
that violates the participation constraint of both types of issuers and no IPO takes place.
Lemma 3 establishes several results. First, in a zero profit equilibrium the IPO takes
place only when B receives favorable information about S’s type (σ = h). By contrast, when
information is unfavorable (σ = l), B proposes a price so low that the offer is always rejected
by S, and no IPO takes place. Lemma 3 thus highlights how the presence of an intermediary
may allow separating equilibria to emerge. As seen in section 5, when the issuer sells his
shares directly to the investor, mimicking behavior by type L issuers would systematically
destroy any separating equilibrium. By contrast, when B observes σ = l, her incentive to
pretend otherwise is rather weak. So long as I trades on the basis of his private information,
the likelihood of being stuck with overpriced shares is relatively high if B underwrites them
when σ = l.23 Upon receiving unfavorable information, B therefore prefers to forgo the IPO
altogether. This result suggests that the intermediary acts as a screening device, ensuring
that firms that manage to go public have, on average, higher quality than those that do not.
This benefits I, since B’s choice to underwrite or not credibly reveals her information. In a
sense, through underwriting, B is forced to “put her money where her mouth is”.
Second, when the IPO takes place, B selects the lowest price at which the high quality
issuer is willing to sell the shares. A higher price would benefit the issuer, but would hurt
the intermediary. By setting a higher price, B would sell the shares with a lower probability
since I would only buy for higher realizations of his signal. As seen in the discussion of
lemma 2, B revises her valuation for the shares downwards when I chooses not to buy them.
Paying a higher price to the issuer and selling with a lower probability is thus unambigu-
ously detrimental to B. Therefore, conditional on type H’s participation, the intermediary’s
expected profits are strictly decreasing in p. Lemma 3 thus shows how B’s pricing strategy
in the zero-profit equilibrium totally diverges from S’s pricing strategy under direct issues:
B selects the lowest possible price that satisfies type H’s participation constraint.
The next lemma provides sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of a zero
profit equilibrium.
23On the other hand, mimicking would allow B to profit from the underwriting fee. However, it turns out
that the value of φ ensuring that B makes zero profit when σ = h is low enough to discourage mimicking
when σ = l.
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Lemma 4. (Existence and uniqueness of a zero-profit equilibrium) If (1 − pih)U(uH , L) +
V (uH ,H)−K > 0, then Φ is non-empty. If U(p,H)− U(p, L) is non-increasing in p, Φ is
a singleton for K sufficiently small.
The condition (1− pih)U(uH , L) + V (uH ,H)−K > 0 ensures the existence of a fee such
that B makes zero profits and trade between B and I occurs with positive probability. The
expression (1−pih)U(uH , L)−K represents the maximum expected loss that the intermediary
may suffer from underwriting.24 The term V (uH ,H) corresponds to the maximum fee that
is compatible with participation by a high quality issuer. When this is greater than the
maximum expected loss, a positive probability of trade is assured.
Note that, given uH > vH > uL, V (uH ,H) > 0 and U(uH , L) < 0. Hence, provided
that K is not too large, existence is ensured for sufficiently high values of pih. This makes
clear that our results do not rely on B having inferior information to S. Indeed, trade is
most likely to occur when B’s information is almost perfect. Note that pih is increasing both
in η and in λ. This can be used to make predictions on the conditions that favor trade
while ensuring the viability of the intermediary. If type L are frequently drawn (low λ), B’s
information should be very precise (high η). In other words, when bad firms are frequent, B
must be an effective screening device. By converse, if B’s information is not precise, type L
firms must be infrequent.
The requirement that K should not be too large has a natural interpretation. In equilib-
rium, I only buys when his signal s is sufficiently high. Hence, B stands to keep the shares
with a positive probability. If K is too large, then the value of φ required to compensate B
from losses incurred in that instance would be so large as to outweigh any gain from trade
between I and S.
Finally, the requirements for uniqueness ensure that the marginal gain from quality to
the buyer (U(p,H)−U(p, L)) does not increase with the price. This is however not necessary
for the existence of the equilibrium.
The following proposition summarizes the results discussed in this section.
Proposition 2. When B makes zero expected profits, trade from S to I may occur with
positive probability provided that B’s information is not too imprecise and/or K is not too
large. Under these conditions, B goes ahead with the IPO only when her signal is favorable,
in which case she selects the lowest price at which the type H issuer is willing to trade.
24When the price is equal to uH , I never buys. Hence, the expected loss from underwriting is pihU(uH , H)+
(1− pih)U(uH , L)−K = (1− pih)U(uH , L)−K.
23
6.3 Implications for underpricing
We now discuss the implications of the model for underpricing. The objective is to assess
whether shares that change hands are on average under or overpriced. We define as under-
pricing (overpricing) a situation in which, at the offering price, the investor would make a
profit (loss) if buying.25 Average underpricing then occurs if, at the equilibrium price, the
expected quality on offer is such that the investor would make expected profits.
We show that the causes of underpricing are twofold. First, the intermediary suffers from
an informational disadvantage vis-a`-vis the investor. This implies that shares bought by I
are on average underpriced while shares bought by B are on average overpriced. Second, the
pricing behavior of the intermediary results in shares being on average underpriced (indepen-
dently of who buys them) even when B’s informational disadvantage becomes vanishingly
small.
Proposition 3 summarizes the first point.
Proposition 3. Assume that B’s expected profits are zero and trade between B and I occurs
with positive probability (i.e. φ ∈ Φ). Then, in equilibrium: i) shares in the hands of I are
on average underpriced; ii) shares in the hands of B are on average overpriced.
This result is a direct consequence of the adverse selection problem suffered by B when
trading with I. In the zero profit equilibrium this problem is especially pronounced since B’s
pricing strategy perfectly reveals her information to I. By contrast, I’s information remains
private. Hence, I has an informational advantage vis-a`-vis B. The seller’s curse is therefore
extreme. On average, when B manages to sell the shares, these are underpriced; when she
is unable to sell them, they are overpriced.
The result has an implication for the relationship between underpricing and amount
subscribed. In equilibrium, shares of both type L and type H issuers are underwritten by
the investment bank with positive probability. Those of type H issuers are underpriced while
those of type L issuers are overpriced. I is more likely to observe a high realization of his
private signal s when the issuer is of type H than when the issuer is of type L. Hence,
he is more likely to buy when the issuer is of type H. This implies that there is a positive
correlation between I’s decision to buy and the likelihood that shares are underpriced. This is
line with the findings of Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) who find positive correlation between
underpricing and oversubscription.
25Using B rather than I as a benchmark for defining under/overpricing would not change any of the results.
24
To fully appreciate the role of the intermediary, it is important to assess whether average
underpricing emerges simply as a result of the intermediary’s informational disadvantage or
it is also driven by her pricing incentives. To this purpose, we consider what happens when
B’s informational disadvantage disappears. We accordingly analyze the limiting case where
B is almost perfectly informed, i.e. pih → 1.
Proposition 4. For pih → 1, trade between B and I occurs with positive probability if and
only if shares are on average underpriced.
Proposition 4 shows that, in the limiting case, trade occurs if and only if shares are on
average underpriced. The intuition relies on the positive relationship between the equilib-
rium price and B’s informational disadvantage vis-a`-vis I. The greater this informational
disadvantage, the more severe the seller’s curse, and the greater the fee necessary to cover
B’s expected losses from her underwriting activities. In order to ensure S’s participation, B
then has to charge a higher price. Otherwise, S would not accept to trade, given that he has
to pay a large fee to B. By converse, when B’s signal is sufficiently precise, the fee necessary
for B to break even is small. The price charged by B is accordingly low and underpricing
occurs.
6.4 Implications for book-building
The analysis so far has highlighted the informational disadvantage that B may have with
respect to I and its consequences for trade and underpricing. Two features of real world
IPOs are relevant for this problem. First, differently from the issuer, the intermediary may
be involved in a repeated interaction with some investors (e.g. institutional investors).26
Second, as discussed by Jagannathan and Sherman (2004), there is a general trend towards
investment banks adopting book-building mechanisms in which they retain discretion over
share allocation. Through repeated interaction and discretionary share allocation, the in-
termediary could be able to induce the investor to reveal his information and/or to commit
to purchase the shares on offer.27 This idea is consistent with the information extraction
literature pioneered by Benveniste and Spindt (1989).
We do not explicitly model the repeated game between the intermediary and the investor.
We instead take it as given that, through book-building, the intermediary and the investor
26See for instance Chen and Wilhelm (2008).
27Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) find that that higher and more informative bids are typically awarded
with more favorable allocations, providing thus evidence for the information extraction hypothesis. [Notice
however that this evidence may be also consistent with a winner’s curse story (see Leite, 2006).] Griffin et al.
(2007) discuss the institutional investors commitment to subscribe shares in “cold” offers.
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are able to perfectly align their incentives. The two parties therefore form a coalition whose
information is summarized by the signals σ and s. For K ≥ 0, the joint expected profits
of the coalition are maximized when traded shares are held by the investor rather than by
the intermediary. Hence, we restrict attention to this case. For a given tuple {σ, s, p, φ}, it
is easy to show that the coalition’s joint expected profits when the IPO takes place can be
written as:
piσfH(s)U(p,H) + (1− piσ)fL(s)U(p, L)
piσfH(s) + (1− piσ)fL(s) + φ (15)
We refer to this extreme case of perfect alignment of interests as “perfect book-building”.
Although in reality one expects the interests of the two parties to be less than perfectly
aligned, the analysis of this extreme case provides us with a useful benchmark against which
we may evaluate fixed price offers.
Proposition 5. (Perfect book-building) Given φ such that trade occurs with positive proba-
bility with a fixed price offer, trade also occurs with perfect book-building, but not vice-versa.
Removing the asymmetry of information between the intermediary and the investor has
two effects. On the one hand, it eliminates the seller’s curse suffered by the intermediary,
who can now avoid ending up holding overpriced shares that have been “dodged” by the
investor. On the other hand, it eliminates the opportunity for the intermediary to “fool”
the investor, by selling him shares over whom she has received unfavorable information.28
While the first effect clearly benefits the intermediary, the second may not. Nevertheless,
proposition 5 shows that the first effect is dominant. Hence, book-building always softens
the trade-off between trade and viability identified in section 6.1 for fixed price offers.
Since book-building aligns the interests of the intermediary and those of the investor,
one may be tempted to conclude that book-building practices must necessarily hurt the
issuer. Proposition 5 shows that this argument may be misguided. By reducing informational
asymmetries between the intermediary and the investor, book-building removes a major
obstacle to the intermediary’s viability. Since the intermediary’s viability is a necessary
condition for trade, book-building may thus indirectly benefit the issuer.
It is worth noting that proposition 5 holds even if we restrict attention to simple ar-
rangements where the intermediary cannot benefit from the profits realized by the investor
and vice-versa. Side transfers between the intermediary and the investor are therefore not
28This does not occur in the zero profit equilibrium discussed in the previous section, but it could occur in
other equilibria (pooling or hybrid).
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necessary for the result. This is important since in most countries these types of transfers
are illegal.
So far, we have modelled book-building as an information sharing coalition in the spirit of
the information extraction literature. In a recent paper, Gondat-Larralde and James (2008)
propose an alternative theory of book-building. Rather than trying to extract information
from the investors, the intermediary uses repeated interaction to punish investors when
they refuse to purchase the shares on offer. The side product of such “block-booking”
arrangements is that investors lose incentive to acquire information, since they cannot trade
on it. The following corollary proves that the result highlighted in proposition 5 continues
to hold even if we allow for this potential shortcoming of book-building.
Corollary 1. Proposition 5 holds even if the intermediary-investor coalition only observes
σ.
Intuitively, although block-booking does not allow the intermediary to acquire any addi-
tional information, it is nevertheless sufficient to ensure that the she does not suffer from a
seller’s curse. This in turn ensures that the set of parameters for which trade may occur is
larger than under fixed price offers.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that the intermediary-investor coalition always finds
it optimal to charge the lowest price that is acceptable by a high quality issuer. This matches
the result in lemma 3 for fixed price offers. Hence, our theory implies that pricing incentives
are independent of the issuing mechanism used by the intermediary. This may be relevant in
the light of the fact that underpricing seems to emerge independently of whether investment
banks use fixed price offers or book-building (see e.g. Jagannathan and Sherman, 2006).
7 Robustness and Extensions
In this section, we informally discuss how our results may apply also when some of our
assumptions do not hold. We concentrate on four issues. First, we consider a situation
where the issuer may potentially signal his type through his choice of both a share price
and the number of shares he puts up for sale on the market. Second, we discuss possible
modifications of the information structure. As a third point, we address the implications of
ignoring equilibrium refinements, and allowing multiple equilibria to emerge in the model.
Finally, we consider a situation where, under perfect information, both high and low quality
firms should be traded.
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As will become clear below, all cases are characterized by a common theme. The key idea
is that under direct issue, low quality firms have a strong incentive to mimic high quality
firms. This reduces either the average quality or the amount of trade that can be achieved
in equilibrium. By contrast, the intermediary’s incentive to mimic when she has received
unfavorable information are comparatively weak. As a result, distortions are reduced.
Most of the claims we make in this section are formally proved in section D of the
appendix.
7.1 Allowing for two instruments
The model analyzed in previous sections assumes that the only instrument available to the
issuer to signal his type is the share price. What would happen if the issuer could vary
both the share price and the number of shares on sale? In that case, he would have two
rather than one instrument at his disposal. It is therefore legitimate to wonder whether this
greater scope for manoeuvre could allow the high quality issuer to credibly signal himself,
eliminating the problems highlighted in Section 5. We argue that this conjecture is misguided.
Under conditions (a) and (b) of Section 3, mimicking behavior by low quality firms may
not be prevented, even if the issuer can use both price and number of shares as signals.
Intuitively, any combination (price, number of shares) such that the high quality issuer
wishes to undertake the IPO would also attract the low quality issuer. This point can be
illustrated using the simple linear payoffs framework. Suppose that the value of S’s firm is
vq. By going public, S sells a fraction 1 − z of the firm for a payment p. The issuer’s net
payoff from going public is:
V (p, z, q) = p− (1− z)vq (16)
Since vH > vL, it follows that V (p, z,H) < V (p, z, L) for all z ∈ (0, 1) and p > 0. In this case,
any pair (p, z) that satisfies type H’s participation constraint would also satisfy type L’s.
Consider now type L’s incentive compatibility. In a separating equilibrium, type L would
be unable to trade (given uL < vL). It follows that he would always profit from mimicking
type H. Separating equilibria are therefore not possible.
7.2 Information Structure
The information structure introduced in section 4 may raise a number of concerns: (1) Does
it matter that the issuer has better information than the investment bank? (2) What would
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happen if the investment bank had no private information? We argue that our results are
robust to these modifications of the information structure.
To address question (1) suppose that both the issuer and the intermediary perfectly
observe the issuer’s type. Since the intermediary is perfectly informed, she no longer suffers
from an informational disadvantage vis-a`-vis the investor. As a result, φ > 0 is no longer
required for her to break even. It can be shown that there exist a continuum of zero-profit
equilibria such that φ is zero and the IPO takes place only when the issuer is of type H, in
which case the investor buys with probability one. However, contrary to the result in lemma
3, the equilibrium price is no longer uniquely determined under D1, but can take any value
in [vH , uH ]. Underpricing still emerges in all but one of the possible equilibria.
Now consider question (2). If the intermediary possesses no private information, her
pricing decisions do not convey any information. The intermediary’s incentives, however,
are unchanged. In the zero-profit equilibrium, her expected payoff is strictly decreasing
in the offering price. Hence, she selects the lowest price acceptable to a type H issuer.
However, here the informational disadvantage the intermediary suffers vis-a`-vis the investor
is maximal, and the value of φ required for her to break even is correspondingly large.
The arguments sketched above make clear that our results are qualitatively independent
of the precision of the intermediary’s information. Although having a well-informed inter-
mediary may be desirable, this is not a necessary condition for intermediaries playing an
important role in the market.
7.3 Direct Issues are Viable
As suggested by proposition 1, without intermediaries, the IPO market would collapse.
Throughout the paper, we have relied on this result to justify the existence of interme-
diaries in IPOs. Here, we extend the analysis to cases in which proposition 1 may not fully
apply so that direct issues could be viable. One may wonder whether there is any need
for intermediaries in these cases. We argue that, in most circumstances, the presence of an
intermediary increases either the amount or the average quality of trade (or both). This
could provide a possible justification for the existence of intermediaries even when direct
issues would be viable.
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7.3.1 Equilibria that fail D1
In the main body of the paper we use an equilibrium refinement (D1) that dramatically
reduces indeterminacy. The refinement predicts that, when considering direct issues, the
unique (refined) equilibrium involves no trade at all, and that, under intermediated issues,
the offering price is unique when the intermediary’s profits are zero. An alternative approach
is that of ignoring the refinement and allowing for multiple equilibria. We argue that this
would not invalidate our results. To see this, consider first the case of direct issues. There
exist a continuum of perfect Bayesian equilibria such that both types are pooled at some
offering price p ∈ [vH , uH ]. In these equilibria, I uses a threshold strategy on his signal when
observing p and chooses not to buy when observing any other price. This strategy is in turn
sustained by (D1-failing) beliefs assigning probability one to type L when observing any price
different from p. Efficiency would require that H firms be traded with probability one and
L firms with probability zero. These equilibria are thus inefficient, since low quality firms
may be traded with a positive probability and high quality firms are traded with probability
less than one.
Consider now intermediated issues. As noted in 7.2, if the intermediary is perfectly
informed, then a situation where the IPO takes place only when the issuer is of type H (in
which case the investor buys with probability one) is an equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
the intermediary achieves full efficiency, something that could not be reached through direct
issues. Hence, the use of an intermediary is clearly beneficial. What if the intermediary
is only imperfectly informed? Without refinement, the equilibrium price in the zero-profit
equilibrium is not necessarily ph = v
φ
H . However, perfect Bayesian equilibria still involve full
revelation of the intermediary’s information through the price choice (the intermediary goes
on with IPO only when she receives favorable information). This stands in contrast with
the case of direct issues in which no information is revealed. However, it also introduces a
different source of inefficiency. If the intermediary has received misleading information, she
may prevent the investor from trading with a high quality issuer. A trade-off then arises.
On the one hand, in the separating equilibrium, the intermediary reveals her information to
the investor. Keeping everything else equal, this improves efficiency. On the other hand, the
intermediary may also mistakenly prevent good firms from going public. As her information
becomes more precise, the second effect weakens, while the first becomes stronger. When
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the intermediary is perfectly informed, the second effect disappears altogether.
7.3.2 Low quality firms should also be traded
A running hypothesis of our model is that low quality firms would not be traded under
perfect information. This assumption plays an important role in ensuring that, under direct
issues, no separating equilibrium is possible, and trade may collapse altogether. A natural
question is therefore whether the case for intermediaries would collapse if all firms generated
gains from trade when going public independently of their quality. We argue that this is not
the case. As discussed in Ellingsen (1997), in this case the only refined equilibrium that may
emerge with direct issues is a separating equilibrium where trade is rationed for high quality
firms – i.e., high quality firms sell their shares with probability less than one. By contrast
efficiency would require that all types of firms be traded with probability one.
Consider now intermediated issues. First, suppose that the intermediary is perfectly
informed. In this case, there exists a continuum of equilibria in which trade occurs for sure.
We refer to these equilibria as “efficient equilibria” since they maximize social welfare. In
an efficient equilibrium, the intermediary selects
p =
 pH ∈ [vH , uH ] when q = HpL ∈ [vL, uL] when q = L (17)
the issuer always chooses to sell at pq, q = H,L, and the investor always buys. Efficient
equilibria are typically separating (i.e. pH 6= pL) – although a pooling can also be efficient
when uL > vH . These equilibria are sustained, for instance, by beliefs assigning probability
one to type H when observing any out of equilibrium price in the interval [vH , uH ] and
probability one to type L for prices lower than vH . It is easy to check that these beliefs
pass D1. Given the other party’s strategy, both the investor and the intermediary have no
incentive to deviate. It is then immediate to check that selling at pq is a best reply for
S. When one of these equilibria is selected, the presence of an intermediary unambiguously
improves welfare, since it ensures full efficiency.
Now suppose that the intermediary is not perfectly informed. As seen in lemma 3, the
intermediary then selects the price to maximize the probability of selling the shares she has
underwritten. Suppose that uL > vH . Then, if v
φ
H < uL, by selecting a price p ∈
[
vφH , uL
]
the intermediary would be able to sell the shares with probability one. This is clearly her
favorite course of action. Intuitively, therefore, the zero-profit equilibrium outcome would
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have: φ = 0, p ∈ [vH , uL]. This outcome would again generate full efficiency, since trade
between the issuer and the investor would occur with certainty. Overall, therefore, the case
where the intermediary is fully informed and the case where uL > vH provide examples of
how the use of an intermediary may be desirable, even when both high and low quality firms
should be traded.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a possible rationale for the presence of financial intermediaries in security
issues, something that has been largely ignored by previous theoretical literature. We have
shown how, in certain circumstances, signaling concerns by issuers may cause severe market
inefficiencies when intermediaries are absent. The presence of a price-setting intermediary
acting as an underwriter increases efficiency. However, the intermediary is not financially
viable unless the underwriting fee she receives from the issuer is sufficiently high. This is po-
tentially problematic, since hefty fees may dissuade firms from issuing securities, even when
this would be efficient. Nonetheless, we show that a zero-profit equilibrium – where the
intermediary just breaks even on average – can exist. In this equilibrium, the intermediary
acts as a screening device, by agreeing to underwrite only the issues of firms over which she
has favorable information. An important lesson that emerges from our analysis is that con-
flicts of interests between issuers and intermediaries are not necessarily detrimental – to the
contrary, they actually increase efficiency. By contrast, misalignments of interests between
intermediaries and investors may seriously damage trade, by preventing intermediaries from
being viable.
Our model opens up several avenues for future research. For instance, it would be inter-
esting to provide an explicit analysis of the market for intermediary services. In principle,
competition in this market may take two different forms. On the one hand, we may have
intermediaries competing to attract firms wishing to issue securities. On the other hand,
we may have different firm-intermediary pairs competing to attract investors. Whether fully
unregulated competition would deliver trade is not entirely clear. Our paper has shown that,
for trade to occur, a conflict of interests must exist between the issuer and the intermediary.
However – at least in the first case described above – in order to become more attractive to
potential clients, intermediaries may have an incentive to find devices that align their inter-
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ests with those of the issuers. So, in the absence of any form of regulation, market forces
could potentially act against efficiency. Interventions that limit investment banks’ scope for
manoeuvre in aligning their interests with the issuers’ could then enhance efficiency.
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A Appendix
A.1 Model Background
In this section we provide a rationale for the assumptions on the payoffs. We sketch two
stories. In the first the issuer seeks cash to finance an expansion of the firm’s activities. In
the second a venture capitalist wants to cash out part of the value of his current venture in
order to invest in a new venture. Several elements are common to both examples:
• All players can invest at the market rate r ≥ 1.
• The issuer cannot borrow.
• There is a small cost in going public: a small amount c > 0 of resources is wasted in
order to complain with regulatory requirements (transparency etc.).
• The issuer has already invested an amount a > 0 in the firm.
• Only type H firms yield above market returns. The per unit of finance return of the
initial investment a is RH > r for firms of type H and is RL = r for firms of type L.
For both stories, we discuss the assumptions that ensure that conditions (a) and (b)
discussed in section 2 are met. We also provide simple numerical examples that illustrate
how, under (a) and (b), all the other assumptions we make are met rather naturally.
(i) Financing Further Growth. Consider the case of an entrepreneur who relies
on the stock market to finance a possible expansion of his firm. There are two types of
entrepreneurs: high ability (type H) and low ability (type L). Firms of type H entrepreneurs
are high quality firms, in that they have growth opportunities (positive NPV projects),
while firms of type L entrepreneurs do not. More precisely, entrepreneurs of type H can
make further investments with positive NPV. We assume for simplicity that these further
investment opportunities consist of one project to be conducted within the firm, which
requires one unit of finance. If less than one unit of finance is invested, the project is
unsuccessful, and yields a zero return. Provided that the unit of finance is invested, the
project is successful and yields an above market return. We let this return be denoted as
RIPOH > r. Following Tirole (2006, p. 244), we assume that it is not possible to contract
on the cash flow generated by this additional project separately from that of the projects
already in place within the firm. Moreover, since the entrepreneur is credit-constrained, we
restrict attention to situations where the IPO allows him to raise the whole unit of finance
he requires.
Type L firms have no positive NPV projects, but only carry projects that yield the
market rate r. Hence, they have the same unit return whether they go public and raise
finance or stay private: RIPOL = RL = r.
Given RH the return of assets in place for q = H, the present value of the firm to the
entrepreneur in the absence of IPO is{
RHa
r if q = H.
a if q = L.
(A.1)
This represents the opportunity cost incurred by the entrepreneur when going public. Note
that, since RH > r, this opportunity cost is always greater when q = H than when q = L.
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This reflects the persistence of entrepreneurial ability: not only do type H entrepreneurs
have better investment opportunities, they also have more valuable firms.
The value of the firm after the IPO has taken place (and one extra unit is injected in the
firm) is {
RIPOH +RHa
r − c if q = H.
1 + a− c if q = L. (A.2)
The investor’s alternative to purchasing the shares is that of investing his unit of capital
at the market rate. The net surplus generated when the firm goes public is thus equal to{
RIPOH −r
r − c if q = H.
−c if q = L. (A.3)
Given c > 0, it is clear that, from an efficiency standpoint, low quality firms should not
go public (condition (b)). This is because, when quality is low, going public entails no benefit
(since the cash raised is used to finance a project that yields the same return as the market),
but only costs. In contrast, provided that c is not too large – so that
(
RIPOH − r
)
/r− c > 0
– high quality firms should indeed go public. By going public, the entrepreneur is able to
finance a project that yields returns exceeding those provided by the market.
We now turn to condition (a). This is satisfied if a type L entrepreneur would be willing
to go public for all offering prices such that a type H entrepreneur would be willing to do so,
but not vice versa. Suppose that the entrepreneur offers a fraction 1 − z of the company’s
profits in exchange for one unit of finance to be injected into the company. Let the total
number of shares be normalized to one. The price of a share is thus p = 11−z so that z = 1− 1p
(henceforth denoted as z(p)). The net payoff of a type q = H,L entrepreneur is:
V (p, q) =
 z(p)
(
RIPOH +RHa
r − c
)
− RHar if q = H.
z(p) (1 + a− c)− a if q = L.
(A.4)
while the net payoff for the investor is:
U(p, q) =
 (1− z(p))
(
RIPOH +RHa
r − c
)
− 1 if q = H.
(1− z(p)) (1 + a− c)− 1 if q = L.
(A.5)
The conditions that need to be satisfied to induce the entrepreneur to go public are
z(p) ≥

RHa
RIPOH +RHa−cr
if q = H.
a
1+a−c if q = L.
(A.6)
Condition (a) is satisfied whenever
c <
RH −RIPOH
RH − r (A.7)
Condition (A.7) ensures that the minimum share price at which type H issuers are willing
to go public is higher than for type L. This is always the case whenever c is not too large
and
RH > R
IPO
H (A.8)
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Inequality (A.8) states that there are decreasing returns to investment. For instance, the
(financially constrained) issuer may have allocated the initial a to the project with the highest
NPV. Further projects, while still ensuring a positive NPV, will yield a lower return.29
It is straightforward to verify that all our restrictions are satisfied for reasonable param-
eter values. Consider for instance a = r = 1, RIPOH = 1.25, RH = 1.5. In this case, we
have
V (p, q) =
{
z(p) (2.75− c)− 1.5 if q = H.
z(p)(2− c)− 1 if q = L.
U(p, q) =
{
(1− z(p)) (2.75− c)− 1 if q = H.
(1− z(p)) (2− c)− 1 if q = L.
so that vH = 2.75−c1.25−c , vL =
2−c
1−c , uH = 2.75− c and uL = 2− c
(A.9)
The requirement for condition (b) to be met – namely, that
(
RIPOH − r
)
/r−c > 0 – becomes:
c < 14 . Whenever this is the case, uH > vH > vL > uL and assumptions A2-A4 are satisfied.
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As for A1, the requirement that V (p,H) < V (p, L) ∀p ∈ R+ is unnecessarily restrictive, and
was imposed in section 4 only for notational convenience. Even if V (p,H) ≥ V (p, L) for
some p > uH , this is irrelevant since these prices violate I’s participation constraint. The
relevant requirement is therefore that V (p,H) < V (p, L) ∀p ∈ [0, uH ]. It is straightforward
to verify that, in the numerical example, V (p,H) < V (p, L) for all p such that z(p) < 2/3.
This is always met for all values of p ∈ [0, uH ].
(ii) Cashing out. Consider now the case of a venture capitalist (VC) who wants to
raise one unit of finance to be invested in a new venture. The setup is very similar to that
of case (i). The only difference here is that the new investment is not carried out within the
existing firm but within a new venture whose cash flows are entirely appropriated by the
VC. As discussed above and in section 3, the types H and L can be interpreted as capturing
the VC’s ability (or experience). A more skilled VC has greater ability to identify profitable
projects. The profitability of both his current and new ventures is therefore higher.
The notation is the same as in case (i) with the exception of RIPOq which now indicates
the return that the VC obtains from investing the unit of capital in the new venture. As
before, we set RIPOL = RL = r.
The outside option for the VC when going public is given by (A.1). Expression (A.2)
now represents the present value of combined assets from the existing firm and the new
project when the IPO takes place. The net surplus generated by the IPO is given by (A.3).
Therefore, as in the previous case, type L firms should never go public whereas type H firms
should go public if c < (RIPOH − r)/r. When this holds, condition (b) is satisfied.
We now turn to condition (a). For simplicity we impose a = 1. The VC’s net payoff is:
V (p, q) =

RIPOH
r + z(p)
(
RH
r − c
)
− RHr if q = H.
z(p) (1− c) if q = L.
(A.10)
29This is in line with the findings of Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) who document that profitability
decreases after the IPO.
30For instance, d(V (p,H)/V (p,L))
dp
= 1
4
1−2c
(z(p)(c−2)+1)2
dz
dp
> 0 given c < 1/4.
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while the net payoff for the investor is:
U(p, q) =
 (1− z(p))
(
RH
r − c
)
− 1 if q = H.
(1− z(p)) (1− c)− 1 if q = L.
(A.11)
The conditions that need to be satisfied to induce the VC to go public are z(p)(RH − cr) ≥ RH −R
IPO
H if q = H.
z(p)(1− c) ≥ 0 if q = L.
(A.12)
If c < 1, type L goes public for all z(p) ≥ 0. In that case, condition (a) is satisfied if
RH > R
IPO
H . If c ≥ 1, type L never goes public. Condition (a) is thus never satisfied –
since, at best, both types are equally reluctant to undertake the IPO. Overall, therefore, the
necessary and sufficient conditions for (a) are:
c < 1 (A.13)
and
RH > R
IPO
H (A.14)
The first requirement is straightforward. The second is equivalent to condition (A.8). Again,
this is consistent with the idea of a VC selecting first the projects with higher NPV.
It is straightforward to verify that all our restrictions are satisfied using the same param-
eter values as in example (i): r = 1, RIPOH = 1.25, RH = 1.5. We have
V (p, q) =
{
z(p) (1.5− c)− 0.25 if q = H.
z(p)(1− c) if q = L.
U(p, q) =
{
(1− z(p)) (1.5− c)− 1 if q = H.
(1− z(p)) (1− c)− 1 if q = L.
so that vH = 1.5−c1.25−c , vL = 0 (for c < 1), uH = 1.5− c and uL = 1− c
(A.15)
The requirement for condition (b) to be met – namely, that
(
RIPOH − r
)
/r−c > 0 – becomes:
c < 14 . Whenever this is the case, uH > vH > vL > uL and assumptions A2-A4 are satisfied.
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As for A1, the discussion at the end of example (i) applies. It is straightforward to verify
that V (p,H) < V (p, L) for all p such that z(p) < 1/2. This is always met for all values of
p ∈ [0, uH ].
B Proof of Proposition 1
We start by showing that there exists no separating equilibrium in which trade occurs. Then
we show that no pooling or hybrid equilibrium in which trade occurs passes D1. Finally, we
show that there exists a D1-refined equilibrium in which no trade occurs.
Lemma B.1. There is no separating equilibrium in which trade occurs.
31For instance, d(V (p,H)/V (p,L))
dp
= 0.25(1−c)
(z(p)(1−c))2
dz
dp
> 0 given c < 1/4.
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Proof. In a separating equilibrium, I always discards her private signal as equilibrium
prices are fully informative. Let Pq be the set of p selected in equilibrium by type q. If
PL ∩ PH = , type L is never able to trade since uL > vL. However, type L would benefit
from trading at any p ∈ PH given that p is optimal for type H and vL < vH . Hence, type L
would always try to mimic type H. 
Lemma B.2. No pooling-hybrid equilibrium in which trade occurs survives D1.
Proof. Assume that trade occurs in a pooling or hybrid equilibrium. Suppose that pooling
occurs at pˆ, with vH ≤ pˆ < uH . A type H issuer selects pˆ with probability βH ∈ (0, 1] and a
type L Issuer announces pˆ with probability βL ∈ (0, 1]. I observes pˆ and receives a signal s.
I’s expected net payoff from buying at pˆ is:
λβHfH(s)
λβHfH(s) + (1− λ)βLfL(s)U(pˆ, H) +
(1− λ)βLfL(s)
λβHfH(s) + (1− λ)βLfL(s)U(pˆ, L) (B.1)
Expected utility is nonnegative if:
fH(s)
fL(s)
≥ −(1− λ)βL
λβH
U(pˆ, L)
U(pˆ, H)
(B.2)
Notice that the LHS is an increasing function of s and the RHS is positive for pˆ ∈ (uL, uH).
Given the full support assumption, there always exists a threshold s∗ ∈ [s, s] such that (B.2)
holds if s ≥ s∗ and does not hold if s < s∗. Hence, I’s threshold strategy is to buy if s ≥ s∗
and not to buy for s < s∗. S’s payoff is:
[1− Fq(s∗)]V (pˆ, q) (B.3)
where q ∈ {H,L}. Suppose now that I observes a deviation p > pˆ. Upon observing p, I
uses a threshold sD (see Be´nabou and Tirole 2003 on this way to use D1). According to
D1, type L can be eliminated from the deviation if the set of values for sD that make him
weakly benefit from the deviation is contained in the set of values that make type H strictly
benefit. Type L would (weakly) benefit whenever:
[1− FL(sD)]V (p, L) ≥ [1− FL(s∗)]V (pˆ, L) (B.4)
Type L is eliminated if, whenever (B.4) holds, the following also holds:
[1− FH(sD)]V (p,H) > [1− FH(s∗)]V (pˆ, H) (B.5)
Note that (B.5) is always verified whenever sD ≤ s∗ since the issuer would get a higher price
and a lower threshold (which implies a higher probability to sell). Consider then sD > s∗.
For a deviation p > pˆ, assumption A2 implies that (B.5) is always satisfied when (B.4) holds
so long as:
1− FH(sD)
1− FH(s∗) ≥
1− FL(sD)
1− FL(s∗) (B.6)
Rewrite the above as:
(1− FH(sD))(1− FL(s∗))− (1− FH(s∗))(1− FL(sD)) ≥ 0 (B.7)
The derivative of the above expression with respect to sD is
−fH(sD)(1− FL(s∗)) + fL(sD)(1− FH(s∗)) (B.8)
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so that the LHS of equation (B.7) is increasing whenever:
fH(sD)
fL(sD)
<
1− FL(s∗)
1− FH(s∗) (B.9)
and is decreasing whenever the reverse inequality holds. Given the MLRP (which implies
that fH(s
D)
fL(sD)
is an increasing function), the LHS of inequality (B.7) must be an increasing-
decreasing function (i.e. increasing for small values of sD and decreasing beyond a threshold).
We note that the limits of (B.7) for sD → s∗ and sD → s are both zero. Since the LHS
of inequality (B.7) is an increasing-decreasing function which converges to zero as sD moves
toward the bounds of (s∗, s), it follows that it cannot be negative in (s∗, s). Hence, (B.6)
holds and type L can be always eliminated. Since type L can be eliminated, for deviations
to p < uH , I would always buy with probability one. But then, it is always optimal for S to
deviate to p ∈ (pˆ, uH), which implies that there cannot be any pooling or hybrid equilibrium
with trade. 
Lemma B.3. There always exists a D1-refined equilibrium in which trade does not occur.
Proof. Consider a situation in which S always announces p = uH and I selects a threshold
equal to s for all p. This is clearly an equilibrium if I believes any deviation to emanate from
type L. It is also robust to D1 since, for any deviation p ≥ vH , the set of I’s best responses
that make type L willing to deviate coincides with the set of best responses that make type
H willing to deviate. Therefore, type L cannot be eliminated. 
C Intermediated Issues
We start by establishing a number of intermediate results that will be extensively used to
prove the results in sections 6 and 6.3. Lemmata C.1-C.2 provide some characterization of
the prices that may emerge in any equilibrium with trade. Lemma C.3 focuses on I’s best
reply in stage 5, taking φ and p as given. Lemma C.4 focuses on B’s interim payoff given φ.
We then turn to the proofs of the results stated in sections 6 and 6.3.
Lemma C.1. Trade between B and I occurs only if p < uH .
Proof. For any p ≥ uH , I would always lose from trading unless p were exactly equal to
uH and I knew the issuer to be of type H for sure. This however cannot happen since: i)
given assumption A1, type L would be willing to trade at p = uH whenever type H would
be willing to trade, ii) neither B nor I are able to perfectly discriminate between L and H,
given the information at their disposal. 
Lemma C.2. If B cannot make losses, the IPO takes place only if V (p,H)− φ ≥ 0.
Proof. The IPO can take place only if type H is willing to sell his shares. This follows
from the assumption that gains from trade are positive only when the firm’s quality is high.
Suppose that the IPO takes place and only type L is willing to sell. Then, if trade between
B and I occurs, I’s payoff is U(p, L), type L’s payoff is V (p, L)− φ, and B’s payoff is equal
to φ. Given assumption A4, the sum of all payoffs is negative for all p. Hence, someone
would be better off by not participating. Suppose now that there is no trade between B and
I. Then, B’s payoff is U(p, L)−K + φ and I’s payoff is zero. Again, the sum of B and S’s
payoffs is negative, implying that either B or S would be better off by not participating. 
As mentioned in section 6, for a given φ, vφH is the price level solving:
V (vφH ,H)− φ = 0 (C.1)
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so that lemma C.2 can be equivalently expressed as p ≥ vφH .
We now turn to I’s optimal strategy at stage 5. The next lemma shows that, abstracting
from B’s incentive to participate, the necessary conditions in lemmata C.1 and C.2, are
sufficient for trade between S and I.
Lemma C.3. Assume that vφH < uH and that B offers a price p ≥ vφH . Then, I follows a
threshold strategy s∗(p) on his signal s. s∗(p) satisfies:
s∗ = s p ≥ uH
λfH(s∗) Pr(p|H)U(p,H) + (1− λ)fL(s∗) Pr(p|L)U(p, L) = 0 uL < p < uH
s∗ = s p ≤ uL
(C.2)
where Pr(p|q), q ∈ {H,L} denotes the probability that I ascribes to observing p given type q.
Corollary C.1. Trade between B and I occurs with positive probability at any p such that
vφH ≤ p < uH .
Proof. Recall that B’s strategy is a map from the set {h, l} of realizations of her signal
σ to the set of probability distributions over p. Since σ is, conditionally on q, independent
of s, p is also independent of s conditionally on q. Hence, it is easy to show that:
Pr(q|s, p) = fq(s) Pr(p|q) Pr(q)∑
q∈{H,L} fq(s) Pr(p|q) Pr(q)
(C.3)
I’s expected payoff from buying at p is therefore:
λfH(s) Pr(p|H)U(p,H) + (1− λ)fL(s) Pr(p|L)U(p, L)
λfH(s) Pr(p|H) + (1− λ)fL(s) Pr(p|L) (C.4)
This can also be written as
λ
(
fH(s)
fL(s)
)
Pr(p|H)
λ
(
fH(s)
fL(s)
)
Pr(p|H) + (1− λ) Pr(p|L)
U(p,H) +
(1− λ) Pr(p|L)
λ
(
fH(s)
fL(s)
)
Pr(p|H) + (1− λ) Pr(p|L)
U(p, L)
(C.5)
Given p ≥ vφH , Pr(p|H) > 0 and Pr(p|L) > 0 (We assume that S accepts to trade when
indifferent). The derivative of (C.5) with respect to s is
d
(
fH(s)
fL(s)
)
ds
λ (1− λ) Pr(p|H) Pr(p|L)(
λ
(
fH(s)
fL(s)
)
Pr(p|H) + (1− λ) Pr(p|L)
)2 [U(p,H)− U(p, L)] (C.6)
From the MLRP, fH(s)fL(s) is a strictly increasing function of s. From assumption A3, U(p,H)−
U(p, L) > 0. Hence, (C.6) is positive, implying that (C.5) is strictly increasing in s. There-
fore, I follows a threshold strategy. Namely, there exists a value s∗(p) such that, for s ≤ s∗(p),
I does not purchase the shares, while, for s > s∗(p), I purchases the shares.
For p ≥ uH , U(p, L) < U(p,H) ≤ 0. Hence, (C.5) is negative for all s and, therefore,
s∗(p) = s (no trade between B and I). For p ≤ uL, U(p,H) > U(p, L) ≥ 0. Hence, (C.5) is
positive for all s and, therefore, s∗(p) = s (trade between B and I occurs with probability
one).
Given uL < p < uH , U(p,H) > 0 and U(p, L) < 0. For s → s, fH(s)/fL(s) → +∞.
U(p,H) > 0 then implies that (C.5) is positive. For s → s, fH(s)/fL(s) → 0. Given
U(p, L) < 0, (C.5) is negative. By monotonicity and continuity, there exists a unique value
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s∗ such that (C.5) is equal to zero. Finally, setting (C.5) equal to zero and rearranging yields
the expression in (C.2). 
We can now derive B’s expected payoff in the subgame starting in stage 2 from announc-
ing a price at which S is willing to trade.
Lemma C.4. Denote as pσ the price set by B upon observing σ ∈ {h, l}, and as s∗(pσ) I’s
threshold when observing pσ. B’s interim expected payoff when the IPO takes place is:
piσFH(s∗(pσ)) (U(pσ,H)−K) + (1− piσ)FL(s∗(pσ)) (U(pσ, L)−K) + φ (C.7)
Proof. Given σ and I’s threshold strategy s∗, the conditional probability that I does not
buy and S is of type H is:
Pr(H, s < s∗|σ) = Pr(s < s
∗, σ|H) Pr(H)
Pr(σ|H) Pr(H) + Pr(σ|L) Pr(L) =
=
Pr(σ|H) Pr(H)
Pr(σ|H) Pr(H) + Pr(σ|L) Pr(L) Pr(s < s
∗|H) = piσFH(s∗) (C.8)
for σ ∈ {h, l}. By the same token, Pr(L, s < s∗|σ) = (1 − piσ)FL(s∗). Expression (C.7)
follows. 
C.1 Proof of Lemma 1
According to lemmata C.1, C.2, and C.3, vφH ≤ p < uH is necessary and sufficient for trade
between B and I to occur with positive probability. We now show that B has incentive to
charge such a price when vφH < uH . If the IPO takes place, then lemma C.2 implies that
B must be charging p ≥ vφH . Hence, all we need to show is that B has incentive to charge
p < uH . Suppose then that B has received a signal σ ∈ {h, l} and that, at equilibrium, she
charges pσ ≥ uH so that no trade occurs between her and I. Given that U(., L) is decreasing
in p and U(p,H) ≤ 0 for p ≥ uH , B’s expected payoff is at most
(1− piσ)U(uH , L)−K + φ (C.9)
By deviating, and charging a lower price vφH ≤ p′ < uH , B could sell with a positive
probability. Denoting as s′ I’s threshold in that case, B’s expected payoff would be
piσFH(s′)
(
U(p′,H)−K)+ (1− piσ)FL(s′) (U(p′, L)−K)+ φ (C.10)
Now,
piσFH(s′)
(
U(p′,H)−K)+ (1− piσ)FL(s′) (U(p′, L)−K)+ φ >
> (1− piσ)U(uH , L)−K + φ (C.11)
if
piσFH(s′)U(p′,H) + (1− piσ)
[
FL(s′)U(p′, L)− U(uH , L)
]
+
+K
[
1− piσFH(s′)− (1− piσ)FL(s′)
]
> 0 (C.12)
Notice that, since p′ < uH , U(p′,H) > 0. Moreover, since U(., L) is strictly decreasing
and U(uH , L) < 0, F (s′ | L)U(p′, L)−U(uH , L) > 0. Finally, 1−piσFH(s′)−(1− piσ)FL(s′) ≥
0. Hence, the inequality is always satisfied. By charging vφH ≤ p′ < uH , B is strictly better
off than by charging pσ ≥ uH .
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C.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Assume φ ≤ 0. Two cases may arise: a) p ≤ uL and b) p > uL. Consider case a). For
p ≤ uL, I is willing to buy for all realizations of s. Hence, trade between B and I occurs
with probability one, so that B’s net payoff is equal to φ. If φ < 0, B makes expected losses.
If φ = 0, lemma C.2 shows that the IPO takes place only if p ≥ vφH = vH > uL, which
contradicts p ≤ uL. Consider now case b). Assume first p ≥ uH so that no trade occurs
between B and I. In this case, B’s profits are at most:
(1− piσ)U(uH , L)−K + φ (C.13)
Given U(uH , L) < 0 and K ≥ 0, B’s profits are negative for all φ ≤ 0. Assume now p < uH
so that trade between B and I occurs with positive probability.
Given lemma C.3, I follows a threshold strategy s∗(p) such that:
λPr(p|H)fH(s)U(p,H) + (1− λ) Pr(p|L)fL(s)U(p, L) < 0 (C.14)
for all s < s∗(p). Notice that:
Pr(p|q) =
{
ηβh + (1− η)βl q = H
(1− η)βh + ηβl q = L (C.15)
where βσ ≡ Pr(p|σ) is derived from B’s equilibrium strategy (we omit the argument p, but
it should be clear that βσis a function of p). Inequality (C.14) can be thus rewritten as:
λ[ηβh + (1− η)βl]fH(s)U(p,H) + (1− λ)[(1− η)βh + ηβl]fL(s)U(p, L) < 0 (C.16)
Since the inequality holds for all s ≤ s∗(p), one can integrate between s and s∗(p) to
obtain
λ[βhη + βl(1− η)]FH(s∗(p))U(p,H) +
+(1− λ)[βh(1− η) + βlη]FL(s∗(p))U(p, L) < 0 (C.17)
When B follows a strategy that consists of announcing p with probability βσ upon observing
σ, B’s ex-ante payoff is:∑
p∈P
{λ[βhη + βl(1− η)]FH(s∗(p))[U(p,H)−K] +
+(1− λ)[βh(1− η) + βlη]FL(s∗(p))[U(p, L)−K] + Γφ} (C.18)
where Γ ≡ λ[βhη + βl(1− η)] + (1− λ)[βh(1− η) + βlη] > 0 and P denotes the set of prices
announced with positive probability. Given K ≥ 0 and (C.17), B’s expected profits for any
p ∈ (uL, uH) can be non-negative only if φ > 0. This proves the first statement of lemma 2.
The second statement follows from the first statement (vφH > vH) and lemma C.2 (p ≥ vφH).

C.3 Proof of Lemma 3
In order to prove lemma 3, we need to characterize the equilibrium in the subgame starting
in stage 2. We first discuss B’s interim participation constraint. This is used to show that
the IPO takes place if and only if B observes σ = h, so that no trade between B and S
occurs when B observes σ = l. We then show that there is only one equilibrium with trade
that passes D1, and this is such that ph = v
φ
H .
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Once σ is observed, the price pσ must satisfy B’s interim participation constraint. Oth-
erwise, B could offer a price pσ so low that S would always reject it and make zero profits
– a situation de facto equivalent to no IPO occurring at all. Moreover, in the candidate
equilibrium, B’s expected profits prior to observing σ must be zero. This can only happen
if the interim participation constraint is satisfied with equality.
B’s interim payoff is derived in lemma C.4. If the IPO takes place for σ = h, the price
ph must then satisfy:
pihFH(s∗(ph)) (U(ph,H)−K) + (1− pih)FL(s∗(ph)) (U(ph, L)−K) + φ = 0 (C.19)
Similarly, if the IPO takes place when σ = l, pl satisfies:
pilFH(s∗(pl)) (U(pl,H)−K) + (1− pil)FL(s∗(pl)) (U(pl, L)−K) + φ = 0 (C.20)
Lemma C.5. The IPO takes place only when σ = h.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Consider an equilibrium in which the IPO takes
place when B observes σ = l. In equilibrium, the incentive compatibility of B when observing
σ = h must be satisfied:
∆ [pihFH(s∗(ph)) (U(ph,H)−K) + (1− pih)FL(s∗(ph)) (U(ph, L)−K) + φ] ≥
pihFH(s∗(pl)) (U(pl,H)−K) + (1− pih)FL(s∗(pl)) (U(pl, L)−K) + φ (C.21)
where ∆ = 1 if the IPO takes place also when B observes σ = h and ∆ = 0 otherwise. Notice
that the price ph, in principle, need not be different from pl if pooling or hybrid equilibria
are possible. Consider first ∆ = 1. In this case both (C.19) and (C.20) must hold. This
implies:
pihFH(s∗(ph)) (U(ph,H)−K) + (1− pih)FL(s∗(ph)) (U(ph, L)−K) =
pilFH(s∗(pl)) (U(pl,H)−K) + (1− pil)FL(s∗(pl)) (U(pl, L)−K) (C.22)
Putting together (C.21) and (C.22), we obtain:
FH(s∗(pl))U(pl,H)− FL(s∗(pl))U(pl, L) ≤ −K [FL(s∗(pl))− FH(s∗(pl))] (C.23)
Note that, since trade occurs between B and I, lemma C.1 requires pl < uH . Lemmata C.2
and 2 then ensure that pl ≥ vφH > uL. Given uL < pl < uH , the LHS of (C.23) is strictly
positive for all s∗ ∈ (s, s). However, since fq(.) satisfies the monotone likelihood property,
[FL(s∗)− FH(s∗)] > 0 for all s∗ ∈ (s, s). This implies that the RHS of (C.23) is strictly
negative. Hence, (C.23) is never satisfied. There is no equilibrium in which the IPO takes
place for both σ = l and σ = h.
Assume now ∆ = 0. Since trade occurs when σ = l, the interim participation constraint
(C.20) must be satisfied. One can then verify that (C.21) and (C.20) imply that (C.23)
should hold also in this case, so that the same argument used for ∆ = 1 applies.
To summarize, given that trade never occurs when B observes σ = l, any equilibrium
with trade must be separating: when σ = h, B goes ahead with the IPO, and offers a price
ph at which trade occurs with positive probability. When σ = l, B does not go ahead with
the IPO. (Equivalently, B goes ahead but offers a price pl ≤ vL, i.e. a price that is never
accepted by S). We now show that this is indeed the case by verifying that, when σ = l, B
has no incentive to mimic and set ph. Forgoing the IPO is incentive compatible if:
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pilFH(s∗(ph)) (U(ph,H)−K) + (1− pil)FL(s∗(ph)) (U(ph, L)−K) + φ ≤ 0 (C.24)
Substituting φ from C.19 and rearranging yields:
FH(s∗(ph))U(pl,H)− FL(s∗(ph))U(pl, L) ≥ −K [FL(s∗(ph))− FH(s∗(ph))] (C.25)
Applying a similar logic to that for (C.23), this is always satisfied for uL < ph < uH . We
now show that ph must be in this range. Since trade occurs between B and I, lemma C.1
ensures that ph < uH . Lemma C.2 ensures ph ≥ vφH . Given lemma 2, this implies ph > uL.

The next lemma characterizes I’s best reply given the separating equilibrium considered.
Lemma C.6. Given the equilibrium price ph, I’s equilibrium threshold s∗(.) solves
pihfH(s∗(ph))U(ph,H) + (1− pih)fL(s∗(ph))U(ph, L) = 0 (C.26)
Proof. This follows from lemma C.3, given uL < ph < uH and ph ≥ vφH . The threshold
s∗(ph) solves
λfH(s∗(ph)) Pr(ph|H)U(ph,H) + (1− λ)fL(s∗(ph)) Pr(ph|L)U(ph, L) = 0 (C.27)
In the separating equilibrium considered, Pr(ph|H) = η and Pr(ph|L) = 1− η. Dividing by
ηλ+ (1− λ)(1− η) and rearranging, one obtains (C.26). 
From lemma 2, vφH > uL. As a result, candidate equilibria are characterized by ph
belonging to the continuum [vφH , uH). We now show that only p = v
φ
H survives D1.
Lemma C.7. The unique offering price that survives D1 is ph = v
φ
H .
Proof. To prove that the unique offering price passing D1 is ph = v
φ
H , we show that any
situation where ph > v
φ
H would be dominated. If I has refined beliefs, B could be better off
by decreasing ph.
To see this, suppose that the equilibrium is such that ph > v
φ
H . Recall that, since φ > 0,
vφH > uL. Consider then a deviation p˜ such that v
φ
H < p˜ < ph. I replies by using threshold
s˜. When observing h, B benefits from the deviation if:
pihFH(s˜)U(p˜, H) + (1− pih)FL(s˜)U(p˜, L)−K [pihFH(s˜) + (1− pih)FL(s˜)] >
pihFH(s∗)U(ph,H) + (1− pih)FL(s∗)U(ph, L)−K [pihFH(s∗) + (1− pih)FL(s∗)] (C.28)
When observing l, B (weakly) benefits if:
pilFH(s˜)U(p˜, H) + (1− pil)FL(s˜)U(p˜, L)−K [pilFH(s∗) + (1− pil)FL(s∗)] + φ ≥ 0 (C.29)
Substituting φ from condition (C.19) – the interim participation constraint for B when σ = h
– one obtains:
pilFH(s˜)U(p˜, H) + (1− pil)FL(s˜)U(p˜, L)−K [pilFH(s˜) + (1− pil)FL(s˜)] ≥
≥ pihFH(s∗)U(ph,H) + (1− pih)FL(s∗)U(ph, L)−
−K [pihFH(s∗) + (1− pih)FL(s∗)] (C.30)
Given p˜ > vφH > uL, then U(p˜, L) < 0. From p˜ < ph < uH , it follows that U(p˜, H) > 0.
Since pih > pil, the LHS of (C.28) is greater than the LHS of (C.30). Hence, if B weakly
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benefits from the deviation upon observing l, then she strictly benefits from the deviation
upon observing h. Following a deviation to a lower price, the investor should then infer that
it comes from B having received signal h. Upon observing such a deviation, I’s threshold
s˜(p˜) is therefore equal to s∗(p˜).
We now show that, given that I’s threshold function stays the same for all p˜ ∈ [vφH , ph],
B has an incentive to deviate to a lower price whenever the participation constraint of the
type H issuer is not binding. To see this, note that differentiating B’s payoff with respect
to p˜ yields:
{pihfH(s∗) (U(p˜, H)−K) + (1− pih)fL(s∗) (U(p˜, L)−K)}ds
∗(p˜)
dp˜
+
+pihFH(s∗)
dU(p˜, H)
dp˜
+ (1− pih)FL(s∗)dU(p˜, L)
dp˜
(C.31)
The last two terms are strictly negative. What about the first term?
From lemma C.6, s∗ solves (C.26). Hence, the first term in (C.31) can be rewritten as:
−K (pihfH(s∗) + (1− pih)fL(s∗)) ds
∗(p˜)
dp˜
(C.32)
which is negative whenever s∗(p˜) is increasing in p˜. Rearranging (C.26), we see that s∗ solves
fH(s∗)
fL(s∗)
= −1− pih
pih
U(p˜, L)
U(p˜, H)
(C.33)
so that
ds∗(p˜)
dp˜
= −1− pih
pih
d
(
U(p˜,L)
U(p˜,H)
)
/dp˜
d
(
fH(s∗)
fL(s∗)
)
/ds∗
> 0 (C.34)
Hence, B’s expected payoff is decreasing in the offering price.
This proves that, in a D1-refined equilibrium with trade, the price ph must be equal
to the minimum price that satisfies the participation constraint of the high quality issuer:
ph = v
φ
H . 
C.4 Proof of lemma 4
The set Φ is the set of values of φ such that: i) trade between B and I occurs with positive
probability; ii) B makes zero profits in expectation.
Let ΦT denote the set of values for φ such that trade between B and I occurs with positive
probability. Given that in equilibrium ph = v
φ
H , any φ ∈ ΦT must satisfy s∗(vφH) < s. This
occurs if and only if vφH < uH . Hence,
ΦT ≡ {φ : vφH < uH} (C.35)
Let
ΦZ ≡ {φ : pihFH(s∗(vφH))U(vφH ,H) + (1− pih)FL(s∗(vφH))U(vφH , L)−
−K
[
pihFH(s∗(v
φ
H)) + (1− pih)FL(s∗(vφH))
]
+ φ = 0} (C.36)
denote the set of values of φ such that B makes zero profits. Clearly, Φ = ΦT ∩ΦZ . We start
by determining conditions under which the intersection of ΦT and ΦZ is non-empty. Then
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we turn to uniqueness. Φ is non-empty if there exists φ ∈ ΦZ such that vφH < uH . Using the
identity φ = V (vφH ,H), the equation in definition (C.36) can be rewritten as:
pihFH(s∗(v
φ
H))U(v
φ
H ,H) + (1− pih)FL(s∗(vφH))U(vφH , L)−
−K
[
pihFH(s∗(v
φ
H)) + (1− pih)FL(s∗(vφH))
]
+ V (vφH ,H) = 0 (C.37)
Since vφH is an increasing function of φ, finding values of v
φ
H for which (C.37) is satisfied is
equivalent to finding values of φ for which it is satisfied.
The upper limit for vφH is uH . For v
φ
H ≤ vH , the LHS of (C.37) is negative. This is
because: (1) the first line of (C.37) is negative (this can be shown by using the optimal
condition for I’s threshold – lemma C.6), (2) K ≥ 0, and (3) for all φ ≤ 0 (equivalently,
vφH ≤ vH), V (vφH ,H) ≤ 0. By continuity, therefore, if the LHS of (C.37) is positive when
vφH → uH , then there exists a value φ ∈ ΦZ such that vφH < uH . Consider then vφH → uH .
The LHS of (C.37) converges to:
(1− pih)U(uH , L) + V (uH ,H)−K (C.38)
This proves the first statement of lemma 4.
We now prove the second part of the lemma. To do this is sufficient to show that the
LHS of (C.37) is increasing in vφH . Differentiating the LHS of (C.37):
pih[fH(s∗(v
φ
H))U(v
φ
H ,H) + (1− pih)fL(s∗(vφH))U(vφH , L)]
ds∗(vφH)
dvφH
+
pihFH(s∗(v
φ
H))
dU(vφH ,H)
dvφH
+ (1− pih)FL(s∗(vφH))
dU(vφH , L)
dvφH
+
dV (vφH ,H)
dvφH
−K
[
pihfH(s∗(v
φ
H)) + (1− pih)fL(s∗(vφH))
] ds∗(vφH)
dvφH
(C.39)
From the characterization of the optimal threshold for I in lemma C.6, s∗(vφH) is such that
the first term is zero. Given A4, V (p,H) + U(p,H) is independent of p and therefore:
dV (vφH ,H)
dvφH
= −dU(v
φ
H ,H)
dvφH
(C.40)
It follows that:
pih
dU(vφH ,H)
dvφH
+ (1− pih)
dU(vφH , L)
dvφH
+
dV (vφH ,H)
dvφH
=
= (1− pih)
[
dU(vφH , L)
dvφH
− dU(v
φ
H ,H)
dvφH
]
(C.41)
Given that the RHS of (C.41) is non-negative by assumption, the LHS must also be non-
negative. Since U(p, q) is decreasing in p and Fq(s∗(v
φ
H)) < 1 for q = H,L, the sum of
the second, third, and fourth term in (C.39) is positive. The last term is is negative, but
becomes small as K → 0. By continuity, for K sufficiently small, B’s expected payoff is
strictly increasing in vφH . Hence, for K sufficiently small, we know that if a φ exists that
satisfies (C.37), then it is unique. 
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C.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the equilibrium described in lemma 3. We want to show that, evaluated from
I’s perspective, shares in the hands of I are underpriced and shares in the hands of B are
overpriced. The expected net gain from the shares conditional on I choosing to buy them is:
pih[1− FH(s∗(vφH)]U(vφH ,H) + (1− pih)[1− FL(s∗(vφH)]U(vφH , L)
pih[1− FH(s∗(vφH)] + (1− pih)[1− FL(s∗(vφH)]
(C.42)
From lemma C.6, I follows a threshold strategy that depends on vφH . The threshold s
∗(vφH)
must be such that:
pihfH(s)U(ph,H) + (1− pih)fL(s)U(ph, L) > 0 (C.43)
for all s > s∗(vφH). Integrating (C.43) between s
∗(vφH) and s shows that shares bought by I
are on average underpriced.
We now turn attention to the case in which I does not buy and B holds the shares. The
expected net gain from the shares conditional on I choosing not to buy them is:
pihFH(s∗)U(ph,H) + (1− pih)FL(s∗)U(ph, L)
pihFH(s∗) + (1− pih)FL(s∗) (C.44)
The threshold s∗(vφH) must be such that:
pihfH(s)U(ph,H) + (1− pih)fL(s)U(ph, L) < 0 (C.45)
for all s < s∗(vφH). Integrating (C.45) between s and s
∗(vφH) shows that (C.44) is negative.

C.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the equilibrium discussed in lemma 3. Total expected net gains from the shares
(whether bought by I or not) are:
pihU(v
φ
H ,H) + (1− pih)U(vφH , L) (C.46)
Given the equilibrium in lemma 3, trade between I and B occurs if and only if the price
vφH does not exceed I’s reservation price for a type H issuer: v
φ
H < uH . This is necessary
and sufficient for U(vφH ,H) > 0. It is then clear that, for pih close enough to unity, (C.46) is
positive if and only if vφH < uH . 
C.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Lemmata 1 and 2 show that necessary conditions for trade to occur with positive probability
under fixed price offers are that φ satisfies: 1) vφH < uH and 2) φ > 0. Consider now book-
building. As mentioned in the text, we model book-building as a coalition between B and I
whose information information is summarized by the two signals s and σ. One strategy that
is always available to the coalition consists in B going ahead with the IPO only when it is
profitable for I to buy the shares. This is the case if
piσfH(s)U(v
φ
H ,H) + (1− piσ)fL(s)U(vφH , L) ≥ 0 (C.47)
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where we used the fact that, whenever the IPO takes place, it is always optimal for the
coalition to set p = vφH . Given (C.47), the sufficient condition for the coalition profits (15)
to be non-negative is φ ≥ 0. Suppose that this is the case. Rearranging (C.47), one obtains
fH(s)
fL(s)
≥ −(1− piσ)U(v
φ
H , L)
piσU(v
φ
H ,H)
(C.48)
Given MLRP and the full support assumption, for vφH < uH there always exists s
∗
σ < s
such that the above inequality holds for all s ≥ s∗σ. Overall, therefore, sufficient conditions
for trade to occur with positive probability under book-building are: 1’) vφH < uH and 2’)
φ ≥ 0. Comparing this with 1) and 2) above shows that, whenever trade occurs (with positive
probability) under fixed price offers, trade occurs under book-building but the reverse is not
true. 
D Material not meant for publication
D.1 Proof of Corollary 1
In order to prove the result it is necessary to work with ex-ante expected payoffs as in the
proof of lemma 2. Consider first fixed price offers. A necessary condition for the IPO to
take place is that ex-ante profits for B be non-negative. Denote with βσ the equilibrium
probability with which B announces a price p upon observing σ (we omit the argument p in
the function βσ). B’s ex-ante profits are given by:∑
p∈P
{λ[βhη + βl(1− η)]FH(s∗(p))[U(p,H)−K] +
+(1− λ)[βh(1− η) + βlη]FL(s∗(p))[U(p, L)−K] + Γφ} (D.1)
where s∗(p) is I’s threshold upon observing p, Γ ≡ λ[βhη+βl(1−η)]+(1−λ)[βh(1−η)+βlη] >
0, and P denotes the set of prices announced with positive probability. Consider now book-
building and assume that the coalition only observes σ = h, l. The coalition goes ahead with
the IPO and announces a price p ≥ vφH whenever joint expected profits are non-negative.
An option that it is always open to the coalition is to replicate the pricing strategy under
fixed price offers. Hence, the coalition’s profits are bounded below by the profits achievable
by replicating B’s pricing strategy under fixed price offer:∑
p∈P
{λ[βhη + βl(1− η)]U(p,H) + (1− λ)[βh(1− η) + βlη]U(p, L) + Γφ} (D.2)
Clearly enough, if expression (D.2) is strictly greater than (D.1), then the necessary condition
for trade under fixed price offers is sufficient for trade under book-building. The difference
between (D.2) and (D.1) is:∑
p∈P
{λ[βhη + βl(1− η)][(1− FH(s∗(p))]U(p,H) +
+(1− λ)[βh(1− η) + βlη][(1− FL(s∗(p))]U(p, L) + ΓK} (D.3)
Since K ≥ 0, the last term is non-negative for all p. The term
λ[βhη + βl(1− η)][(1− FH(s∗(p))]U(p,H) +
+(1− λ)[βh(1− η) + βlη][(1− FL(s∗(p))]U(p, L) (D.4)
is I’s expected payoff given p. Optimality of I’s threshold s∗(p) then implies that this is
strictly positive for all p ∈ P. 
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D.2 Proofs of Claims Made in Section 7
Information Structure
Claim 1. When B is perfectly informed, there is a continuum of zero-profit equilibria where:
(i) the IPO takes place only when q = H, (ii) φ = 0, (iii) the offering price is in the interval
[vH ,uH ], and (iv) I buys with probability one.
Proof. Suppose that φ = 0. When q = L, B has no incentive to undertake the IPO: if
she sells the shares with probability one, she earns zero profits, while if she doesn’t sell the
shares with probability one, she makes losses. Therefore, when q = L, not undertaking the
IPO is a best reply for B. Now consider q = H. Let the equilibrium price selected when
q = H be p∗ ∈ [vH ,uH ]. It is clear that, given p∗, purchasing the shares with probability one
is optimal for I. Since at p = p∗ B sells the shares with probability one, she makes neither
losses nor gains from underwriting. Hence, φ = 0 guarantees zero profits. What about B’s
pricing incentives? Suppose that, when he observes an out of equilibrium price p ∈ [vH ,uH ],
I purchases the shares with probability one. Then it is clear that setting p = p∗ when
q = H is optimal for B. Setting p > uH would result in B keeping the high-quality shares
for sure, but would also entail losses. Setting p < vH would not satisfy the H-type issuer’s
participation constraint. Finally, we need to verify that the proposed out of equilibrium
strategy for I – namely, that when he observes an out of equilibrium price p ∈ [vH ,uH ], I
purchases the shares with probability one – does not violate D1. To see that this is indeed
the case, consider an out of equilibrium price p ∈ [vH ,uH ]. Suppose that B selects p and that,
upon observing p, I uses a threshold sD. B’s payoff from deviating to p having observed
q = L is:
(1− FL(sD))(U(p, L)−K) ≤ 0 (D.5)
Hence, for q = L, B can only (weakly) lose from deviating to p. Two cases may then arise:
(1) B loses from deviating to p both when q = L and when q = H, or (2) B only loses from
deviating to p when q = L. In both cases, beliefs such that the deviation emanates from B
having observed q = H are not ruled out by D1. 
Claim 2. When B is entirely uninformed, her expected payoff is decreasing in p.
Proof. Upon selecting a price p ∈ [vH , uH ], B’s expected payoff is
λFH(s∗(p)) (U(p,H)−K) + (1− λ)FL(s∗(p)) (U(p, L)−K) + φ (D.6)
The derivative of (D.6) with respect to p is
[λfH(s∗(p))U(p,H) + (1− λ)fL(s∗(p))U(p, L)] ds
∗(p)
dp
−K ds∗(p)dp [λfH(s∗(p)) + (1− λ)fL(s∗(p))]
+
[
λFH(s∗(p))
dU(p,H)
dp + (1− λ)FL(s∗(p))dU(p,L)dp
] (D.7)
From the definition of s∗(p), the first term in (D.7) is equal to zero. Since ds
∗(p)
dp > 0, the
second term in (D.7) is negative. Finally, from A3(i), dU(p,q)dp < 0 for both q = H,L. Hence,
the third expression in (D.7) is negative, which proves our claim. 
Equilibria that fail D1
Claim 3. When B is perfectly informed, then a situation where the IPO takes place only
when the issuer is of type H (in which case the investor buys with probability one) is an
equilibrium.
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Proof. This trivially follows from claim 1. 
Claim 4. When the intermediary is imperfectly informed, perfect Bayesian equilibria with
zero profits involve full revelation of the intermediary’s information through the price choice
(the intermediary goes on with IPO only when she receives favorable information).
Proof. Consider the proof of lemma 3. Lemma C.5 implies the result. Notice that lemma
C.5 does not require D1. Hence, in all perfect Bayesian equilibria with zero profits, the
intermediary goes on with the IPO only when she observes σ = h. 
Low quality should be traded
Claim 5. Existence of “efficient equilibria” when the intermediary is perfectly informed.
Proof. Consider a situation in which a type q issuer sells whenever p ≥ vq, the intermedi-
ary announces some pq ∈ [vq, uq], and the investor buys with probability one at pq. Clearly
enough, S and I are playing best replies. Assume that I’s beliefs assign probability one to
type H for all out of equilibrium prices in the interval [vH , uH ] and probability one to type L
for all prices lower than vH . These ensure that setting pq is a best reply for the intermediary.
When uL ≥ vH , the intermediary would sell with probability one at all prices in the interval
[vL, uH ]. When vH > uL she would sell with probability one at all prices in the intervals
[vL, uL] and [vH , uH ]. At these prices, her payoff would be equal to φ independently of the
price she announces. When vH > uL, B would sell with probability zero at all prices in the
interval (uL, vH). Given S’s strategy, q = L at all prices (uL, vH) so that B has no incentive
to deviate to these prices. Hence, given I’s beliefs, announcing pq ∈ [vq, uq] is a best reply
for B. Zero profits then requires φ = 0. We now show that I’s beliefs are compatible with
D1. B’s payoff from deviating to any p ∈ [vH , uH ] having observed q is:
(1− Fq(sD))[U(p, q)−K] (D.8)
where sD is I’s threshold upon observing p. Since U(p,H) > U(p, L), if (D.8) is weakly
positive for q = L, then it is strictly positive for q = H. Hence, beliefs such that the
deviation emanates from B having observed q = H are compatible with D1. Finally, if
all qualities generate gains from trade, welfare is maximized when the amount of trade is
maximized. Hence, these equilibria are efficient. 
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